Seoul AirportWhat is the minimum number of nuclear-powered submarines you need for a viable capability? At the moment all six UK SSNs are tied up at Faslane. The outcome of AIR 6500 Phase 1 has been decided – and Lockheed Marin are the worthy winner. However, this seems contrary to the DSR recommendation in favour of an off-the-shelf solution, so what else will be ignored?

Is MQ-28A Ghost Bat under threat? Then the story of how big, brave RAAF officers at a basic flying training school in Tamworth locked their doors and hid under their desks rather than speak with three visiting Australian journalists. By comparison, senior US government and military figures routinely make themselves available to the media – and we learn far more from them than from our own people about what the heck is actually going on.

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Kym Bergmann
Kym Bergmann is the editor for Asia Pacific Defence Reporter (APDR) and Defence Review Asia (DRA). He has more than 25 years of experience in journalism and the defence industry. After graduating with honours from the Australian National University, he joined Capital 7 television, holding several positions including foreign news editor and chief political correspondent. During that time he also wrote for Business Review Weekly, undertaking analysis of various defence matters.After two years on the staff of a federal minister, he moved to the defence industry and held senior positions in several companies, including Blohm+Voss, Thales, Celsius and Saab. In 1997 he was one of two Australians selected for the Thomson CSF 'Preparation for Senior Management' MBA course. He has also worked as a consultant for a number of companies including Raytheon, Tenix and others. He has served on the boards of Thomson Sintra Pacific and Saab Pacific.

6 COMMENTS

  1. So while the USN and RN consistently fail to maintain – deploy their current fleets of SSN (USN deployments of SSN are regularly cancelled-postponed courtesy of chronic maintenance delays, one SSN for eg has been waiting for overhaul since 2018) we’re told to believe that both nations are capable of building, launching, deploying & maintaining fleets of 2 brand new classes of SSN & SSBN for themselves while building Australia’s first SSN fleet coupled with the mountains of training & infrastucture required to maintain then dispose of HEU reactors ?…uh-huh. Meanwhile France (Naval Group) can maintain its current fleet of Rubis class SSN, deploy them to WESTPAC & NATO exercises while building,launching & deploying its new Suffren-Barracuda class SSN (the world’s latest state of the art -extensively automated stealthy SSN with LEU reactors that can be refueled in just 7 days – once a decade and operate with the same crew size as Australia’s Collins class), all while building submarines for Brazil, India and probably the Netherlands.(and before the US-UK sponsored fanboys chime in, Lest We Forget DOD emails obtained under FOI confirmed that Australia’s Attack Class Team was more than happy with the Barracuda project’s progress, it was on schedule and well within budget at the time of cancellation by Morrison’s government. Also Lest We Forget, France-Naval group was more than happy to switch from Australia’s request for conventional propulsion to the Barracuda’s default nuclear design, at anytime )

    • Thanks Mike – you are absolutely correct on all counts. It looks as if Government Ministers can’t even be bothered doing a Google search and just keep mindlessly repeating the nonsense that Defence tells them. All that you have written can be obtained from public sources – it’s simply a matter of being prepared to look. I cannot think of a major Defence decision – let alone one for $368 billion – that has been taken with such ridiculously flimsy justification. As more Australians understand the detail I imagine they will be horrified by what is going on in plain sight.

    • You’re not supposed to notice the blindingly obvious problems with AUKUS.
      In 20 years time, when the RAN do not have a single submarine in service and all the current bunch of hangers-on are long gone everybody will be asking “What happened?”

  2. Hi Kym

    Some interesting financial figures have come out of AFR’s “AUKUS export rules possible ‘Trojan horse’ for bad actors” of 7 Sep 2023 by a US author at https://www.afr.com/world/north-america/aukus-export-rules-possible-trojan-horse-for-bad-actors-20230907-p5e2mt eg:

    1. ““Obviously, we were grateful that the Australians want to invest $US3 billion…” Apparently that is 3 billion US dollars, not Australian dollars as I assumed. US$3 billion = A$4.7 billion.

    and

    2. “The Congressional Budget Office estimates that each new [Virginia] submarine could cost between $US6.2 billion ($8.7 billion) and $US7.2 billion, materially higher than the US Navy’s $US5.6 billion estimate.”

    $US7.2 billion = A$11.3 billion that Australia may need to pay per Virginia at today’s prices?

    I wonder what 10 years of (say) 3% US cumulative inflation would do to US upfront purchase prices, spares and major upgrades/repairs in US costs for the first old refurbished Virginia in 2033?

    • Thank you! That’s a very important pick up about the currency – I also had assumed AUD. If it’s USD that makes the situation far, far worse since that money will be coming from our Defence budget.

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