Enough about the budget and DSR already! Now it’s time to have a look at AUKUS and acquiring nuclear-powered submarines – and it should surprise no one to learn that we are not being told the full story; not even close. Also a conversation with a retired USN Admiral so that people can understand what the Americans really think about Australia – and a warning, it’s not flattering. Finally and briefly, we look at an earlier FMS rip-off of Australia: the C27J purchase.
You can listen to the podcast here.
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Thanks Kym
An interesting podcast on “AUKUS and acquiring nuclear-powered submarines”. Two comments:
1. It may end up that Australia just has a total of 6 SSNs, likely all Virginias, but only from the late 2030s when US production schedules catch up. The drop from 8 to 6 is because the RAN has a history of advocating a higher number of submarines than it subsequently gets. The numbers of UK built Oberons for Australia shrank from 8 to 6. The proposed number of the Collins went from 10, to 8 and finally to 6. This points to no SSNs being built in Australia.
2. The US in the AUKUS SSN “pathway” rotations, for the rest of the 2020s, is not offering more than it has in the past. For decades there has already been a type of US and occasional UK submarine rotation to HMAS Stirling/Fleet Base West. US SSNs and sometimes SSGNs have been visiting Stirling at the rate of one or more per year. A UK SSN has visited every 5 or so years.
As you imply Australia’s expensive allegiance to the US is being enticed with smoke and mirrors.
Thanks. Not surprisingly, I agree with your points.
Hi Kym. I see the main concern with our acquisition of nukes being the large gap between now and when we get this deterrent. Collins subs, as good as they were when first in the water, are reaching their use by date rapidly and we have no alternative except possibly the Andural ghost shark to fill the gap. Not good when we live surrounded by water.
Unfortunately our defence planners have placed us in an unenviable position. If there had been any enthusiasm for an urgent conventional submarine – either KSS-III Batch 2 or NextGen Collins – we could have had something in the water by 2030, which would have been my preferred strategy. By the time the nuclear-powered submarines are available, the South China Sea will be so full of mines, sea floor sonar arrays and PLA(N) submarine-hunting autonomous systems that we won’t be going anywhere near there, which seems to remove the main justification for going nuclear.
Broadly agree with all comments above… I think despite existing infra such as Lucas Heights… Australia faces formidable barriers in operationalizing a sustainable SSN fleet, broadly
1. Nuclear trained manpower: Technicians, engineers and assorted on-land support ecosystem will take 15 years of dedicated effort to generate the ‘first generation’ O&M staff.
2. Construction and O&M facilities: ASC Osborne will need billions of AUD ploughed in ‘ in parallel’ to even maintain the fully built Virginias that the US might give starting 2035. A new set of infra will be needed as SSN O&M is a different ball game vs SSK
3. IAEA, NSG etc: Even assuming the US takes back spent fuel and gets Virginias refueled in the US, the very presence of N-subs will likely need regulatory arrangements on the IAEA, NSG level… point 5 will cover the huge effort that ACT has to make to have a domestic nuclear doctrine…that is consistent with 1-4.
4. Armaments: A conventional armed SSN would be of no use considering the monster that the PLAN is transforming into. ‘dial a yield’ N-armed tomahawks are a sina qua non against PLAN CBGs. Unless 100 kT capable deterrent is there on a few BGM-109s, the SSNs will be atrociously costly baubles the RAN can ill afford.
5. Domestic NCA ala India/UK/US style: a Nuclear Command Authority will be needed with a clearly spelt out nuclear doctrine on second strike etc… and related postures….if operational warheads are put on SSNs then what will be the command chain? who will do what in peace time and in war time?
my country India took 20 years to iron all that out to just get a ‘first draft’ (1982 to 2002) and is still refining it as pakistan and china keep forging ahead…. that is a good 40 years , even with the nuclear program not suffering as much from the regular Indian delay problem.
I cannot but feel a sense of despair looking at ACT today….
Thank you for those additional points.
Thanks for this podcast Kym. I wish every Australian would listen to it because the issues you raise will never see the light of day in the mainstream media.
There are two main issues. One is the type of submarine needed should Australia ever be attacked. Do we need three or four nuclear-powered submarines embedded in (“interoperable with”) the US Navy and stationed in an aggressive posture off the coast of China – the others, if we get more, in dry dock undergoing maintenance and repair? Or do we need a somewhat larger number of non-nuclear boats stationed defensively in and around our own coastal waters and controlled and operated independently of an external power?
The second arises from the first. The comments by the retired US admiral reveal the near-total surrender of Australian national independence and sovereignty to the US. As he correctly, if rather abruptly, explains, we are no longer in a position to exercise a capacity for independent decision-making in matters of foreign policy and defence.
That appalls me, and I thank you for continuing to reveal the problems associated with our dependency on, and subservience to, the USA.
Thanks Mike – I appreciate the feedback. I have a bit more depressing information on the topic that I’m putting together for the next podcast. Speaking of which, what an absolutely appalling example of cultural cringe that decisions about the future structure of our entire surface fleet have been handed over to retired US Admiral Hilarides. If I had been the Australian Chief of Navy, when told about the review I would have quit on the spot saying that the government obviously had lost confidence in my ability to do my job.