As we have reported in the current edition of APDR, a major shakeup is in the pipeline for the senior ranks of Defence. Service Chiefs have been directed to cut 1-star and above positions by 30%. A reduction of similar magnitude is under consideration for APS staff. If carried out in full, this would see about 270 of the highest-paid and most experienced people being politely shown the door.
However, at this stage, there seems to be no change to the structure and function of the Department, so cuts of this magnitude will have the effect of slowing down productivity, not speeding it up – at least not in the short term. If history is any guide, shedding this number of people takes no less than 18 months to be fully effective.
One of the preferred mechanisms are voluntary redundancies, but these favour people either naturally reaching the end of their careers, or having skills that are sought in the private sector. The irony is that while senior positions will be culled, the ADF failed – again – to meet its recruiting targets last financial year and has shrunk in size.
On July 15, writing in the Australian Financial Review, highly influential security analyst Peter Varghese – very well known to Defence – titled his article: “I ran DFAT. I hope Elbridge Colby sinks AUKUS for Australia.” He goes on to explain that Australia must accept the reality that we can defend ourselves even without the full support of the increasingly erratic administration of President Donald Trump.
He also believes that Australia needs to independently assess how to deal with the fact of China’s growing strength and influence rather than blindly following the policy lead of Washington. He predicts that the Trump administration will eventually be replaced by something more normal – but the damage will already have been done with allies such as Australia having to face the fact that the US cannot be automatically counted on, ever.
He concludes that a far higher level of Australian self-reliance is needed and that nuclear-powered submarines should be ditched:
“But defence self-reliance does not come cheap. It will require a significant uplift in our defence budget – not to meet some arbitrary percentage of gross domestic product but to fund the force structure that we need for the defence of Australia. Nuclear submarines distort both the cost and focus of that force structure. If walking away from AUKUS is a bridge too far for the Australian government, the US might yet save us from ourselves by adding conditions which no Australian government could accept.
“A properly funded defence budget is, however, only part of what we need.”
What is also needed is a fundamental rethink of the role of China, with Mr Varghese arguing that Beijing poses no direct military threat to Australia and is not our enemy. However, he also cautions against allowing China to become the regional hegemon and says the best way to push back is for Australia to develop stronger links within Asia, as well as increase our spending on national security.
However, unless there is a fundamental change of mindset within the Department of Defence, this will not happen. Unfortunately, Australian politicians and their bureaucratic servants seem incapable of accepting that the world we now live in is fundamentally different from what it was in 1995 when the US was completely dominant.
There is no point just culling numbers in Defence and hoping for better outcomes. People need to look beyond AUKUS for Australia’s security. Defence Minister Richard Marles is fond of describing AUKUS as a “treaty level agreement.” Unfortunately, there’s no such thing. Either you have a treaty, or you don’t.
There isn’t one for the supply of US nuclear-powered submarines – and the entire world is witnessing that the current Trump administration has no intention of sticking with anything that does not fit the America First agenda. Even then, there is no consistency to decision-making and policy is now in the hands of incompetent ideologues.
It’s time the government and the coalition came to terms with this uncomfortable fact.
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It now looks like one Admiral for each sailor. Top heavy, not enough Indians, all Chiefs .
While that is true that is 270 Officers with over 8,000 years of combined experience about to be lost. ADF needs to acknowledge that this will be lost and attempt to retain them through offering COL equivalent positions.
While it’s popular to mock top heavy organisations, those are the people who generate the business cases for procurement and all the other less sexy work that is needed to increase the ADF’s capability to fight tonight.
I’d be offering the officers involved a chance to Show Cause before I sacked any one . Be careful what you throw out with the bath water . For the size of the Australian population by world comparison we are over governed .
We have far too many STAR Rank officers for the size of our military. Full them and get boots on the ground.
By all appearances, Australia stands shoulder-to-shoulder with the United States in support of Taiwan. We rehearse the language of deterrence, speak earnestly of shared democratic values, and now under AUKUS, we even promise to contribute nuclear-powered submarines in the 2040s. But strip away the diplomatic niceties, and a stark truth emerges: the West has no intention—nor credible plan—of preventing a Chinese strike on Taiwan. Worse still, our war planning is built around waiting for Beijing to make the first move. It’s reactive by design, and strategically naive.
This isn’t a criticism of military brass or the intelligence community. They understand the terrain. The real failure is political—a decades-long addiction to trade, wishful engagement, and deferral. Every serious military analyst knows that a Taiwan conflict would be fought at a time and place of China’s choosing. That makes it a bad war to fight, and an impossible one to win quickly. And yet, rather than alter that equation, we’ve accepted it as inevitable.
Let’s be blunt: if Taiwan were truly considered a vital interest, the West would have acted long ago. Not with talk, but with permanent military presence, economic decoupling, and explicit recognition of Taiwan as a sovereign nation. Instead, we welcomed China into the WTO, deepened trade ties, and let our supply chains and strategic industries migrate across the Pacific. We made ourselves comfortable with ambiguity and profitable with denial.
Now, as China consolidates power under Xi Jinping, the bill is coming due. And Australia, despite its rhetoric, is poorly prepared for what comes next. We lack long-range strike capability. Our defence industry is undercooked. Our reliance on imported weapons systems means any serious engagement would see us run short on munitions within weeks. Worse, we still depend on China for the bulk of our export earnings. In the opening hours of a Taiwan conflict, Canberra would be confronted with two unforgiving facts: we can’t win without the US, and we can’t fight without consequences.
The United States, for its part, is increasingly preoccupied with itself. A second Trump presidency—or even a more transactional, isolationist Washington—may prioritise America First over alliance fidelity. AUKUS is a capability program, not a security guarantee. The ANZUS treaty contains no automatic trigger clause. If the US hesitates, Australia stands alone.
Deterrence only works if it’s credible. That means Australia needs to spend more, build more, and say less. A defence budget of 3–4% of GDP should be the baseline, not the ambition. We need sovereign missile production, hardening of northern bases, a doctrine of national resilience, and a political class that treats defence with the same urgency it treats budget surpluses and energy prices.
In short, if we want to avoid war over Taiwan, we have to act like we might actually fight one. Otherwise, we are just spectators of our own fate—hoping China stays patient and Washington stays interested. History suggests neither is guaranteed.
Jusf another step in winding down our naval & military capability and actuality. This is commensurate with the switcb of FA interaction from the US Alliance to NATO and Europe [look at our illogical and costly intervention in Russia v Ukraine]. It is not agreed that the Trump Admin or Trump is erratic or increasingly so. It is perfectly orchestrated to generate cooperation feom backsliding nations like Austealia..
The article reads that the 270 positions include APS Band 1 and above roles. Not so bad. The issue is that with less decision makers in the ADF then that function will need to be delegated to less-experienced personnel. Unless the lower ranks (CAPT/COL/GPCAPT and below) are supported by their seniors then there is a risk of decision-making paralysis (with less flag-rank positions available then those aspiring to higher rank will not want to be seen to make mistakes).