From the Magazine: ROOM FOR TWO ARMY ATTACK HELICOPTERS

BY KYM BERGMANN // CANBERRA

Official guidance can sometimes be a strange thing. The decision to replace Army’s Tiger Armed Reconnaissance helicopters had its genesis in the 2016 White Paper, where there was a single sentence to that effect. No further information was provided as to why this should be the case. That intention then flowed through to the 2020 Force Structure Plan, with a single dot point to that effect, again without explanation. This generated LAND 4503 Phase 1, which gained First Pass approval in January this year.

Several inquiries to Defence about why the Tigers need to be withdrawn are often met with the same response: because that’s the official guidance. When really pressed for a bit more substance, some of the answers can be just plain silly – like the helicopters are now getting old. Age measured in years has nothing to do with it – the last B-52 bomber came off the production line in 1962 and yet they are still flying and will continue to do so until the 2050s when they will be close to 100 years old. There are plenty of similar examples.

The only proper way to measure the durability of a helicopter is to look at factors such as fatigue life, growth potential and mission suitability. The fully digital Tiger seems to tick all of those boxes. However, it is absolutely true that the ARH fleet had very poor availability for about the first 10 years of service. This led to heavy criticism of the acquisition and the emergence of an anti-Tiger faction within Army with the most enthusiastic participants being the ones who had the least to do with the program. Unfortunately, in Australia once a platform has acquired a bad reputation it is very difficult to shake – as the Collins submarine proves.

The initial availability problems were for complex reasons and there is plenty of blame to go around: lack of spare parts from the manufacturer, slow pilot training, difficulties with Australian requirements that included everything from the weapon mix to the brightness of the night flying lights to whether the canopy can be successfully jettisoned if the helicopter is upside down underwater. This latter requirement was one of the reasons why the Tigers were never deployed to Afghanistan – a landlocked and arid country – presumably in case they needed to ditch in the swimming pool of then President Hamid Karzai.

One is reminded of the Super Seasprite helicopter saga, with the program being cancelled completely in March 2008. The RAN purchased 11 used helicopters from Kaman and spent years trying to upgrade them, with very mixed results involving delays, additional costs and flight safety issues.

A change of Government in 2007 allowed the RAN to present their case to a more sympathetic audience – who decided to get rid of everything: helicopters, simulator, support equipment and weapons. Australian taxpayer: $1.4 billion down the drain; RAN: 0 capability.

To read the whole story in APDR, click here.

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