It has been an open secret that something has not been right with SEA 1180, the project for a new class of Arafura Offshore Patrol Vessels, for a while. They are being successfully constructed by Luerssen Australia – the first two at Osbourne and the remainder in Henderson – but rumours have been swirling for some time about various technical and contractual issues.
This climate of uncertainty has not been assisted by Defence refusing to answer many questions about schedule – and now we have added to the mix the Hilarides review into the entire surface fleet expected to make its recommendations in September. Putting all this together, it looks like the RAN – having specified an OPV; contracted for an OPV; and watched a class of OPVs being built – has simply changed its mind and now wants a Tier 2 heavily armed small surface combatant instead.
As far as APDR has been able to determine there is nothing wrong with the Arafura class, or at least nothing outside the parameters of a normal shipbuilding program, though Luerssen – recently rebranded as NVL – have needed to take a more direct hands-on role than was originally the case. However, the RAN seems to have decided that a very lightly armed ship is not for them, even though they were the ones that stripped the parent design of a powerful main gun and surface-to-surface missiles.
All the Canberra betting is that the construction of Arafura class will cease, and a new program will start to buy Corvettes instead. Definitionally, a Corvette can be approximately the same size as an OPV, but it is designed to military rather than commercial standards and is packed with as many weapons as can be sensibly carried. Having a combat system and being able to embark a helicopter are also typically important features.
As it happens, Luerrsen not only builds OPVs but also Corvettes – and currently has two programs of direct relevance for the RAN: K-130s for the German Navy as it dramatically recapitalises and two C90s for Bulgaria. The good news for Australia is that both classes have considerable overlap with the Arafura design – same general layout, same propulsion, same hull form and numerous overlapping subsystems meaning that commonality is around 70%.
During a media tour looking at both Corvettes, Luerrsen explained that because of this commonality, the company could switch seamlessly from building Arafuras to building new Corvettes without losing time. However, that presupposes a quick decision in their favour and a 6 month design period confirming which weapons and sensors need to be incorporated. Steel on the first ship could be cut in 2024 and delivered in 2028 – and from then on at 10 month intervals.
On the subject of budget, presumably there is something left in the SEA 1180 bucket since this was originally to acquire 12 OPVs and only half of them have been built. But that would only cover a small part of the budget for a new class of Tier 2 combatants so something else will need to be cut or new money found. Given the government’s strange lack of enthusiasm for increasing the size of the Defence budget, APDR suggests cancelling the $3 billion gift to US industry as some sort of weird bribe to get a seat at the AUKUS table. That alone would pay for half a dozen Corvettes.
A more likely casualty will be some of the Hunter class frigates that have been heavily criticised for having only 32 VLS cells as well as the build occurring at glacial pace. It has always been the plan to contract for construction in batches of three and since the first of these has not yet been signed there is scope to reduce the number from the planned nine. Cancelling the entire project and writing off close to $6 billion is probably a bridge too far, though it does have some support.
A C90 could easily accommodate 8 Mk41 VLS cells – the same number as an ANZAC frigate – and 16 at a pinch. They also have a sonar, AWS torpedoes and the capacity for a towed array. A major bonus is that they use the Saab 9LV combat system – with consoles coming from Australia. They would need to be lengthened to embark an MH-60R helicopter but Luerssen – which has been successfully building ships for 120 years – says this sort of design change is routine and low risk.
Another major boost in capability would be to equip them with a CAE fixed face radar array. Luerrsen has done some preliminary design work and APDR has observed that the cubed golf ball structure sits neatly over the bridge area. Luerssen state that the C90 has power and weight margins sufficient to all these changes.
We had the opportunity to discuss this with no less a figure than Peter Luerssen, co-owner of the company, who explained why the C90 design is more suitable for Australia than the K-130:
“The Bulgarian ship has a three-dimensional warfare capability. It is a heavier ship and therefore slower than the one for Germany but it has been designed for very rough seas. You want a stable, strong platform because you (the RAN) will need to be at sea for a prolonged period of time. You can’t do that in a ship that does not offer the best human comfort because without that, the capabilities of the crew will suffer.
“Yes, the K-130 has great capabilities but I think in the waters around Australia you are probably better off with a 90 metre heavy ship.”
Put simply: a fully equipped 2,100 tonne C90 has a lot of combat power for a small ship with a crew of about 60. If Luerrsen were given the go ahead to promptly switch from Arafura – at 1,640 tonnes – to C90 it would pave the way for a rapid restructuring of the surface fleet with an increase in combat strength and power projection throughout the region.
The Australian workforce and supply chain would remain intact and, in many cases, would be unaware that anything has changed. The existing Arafuras could continue to be used for various peacetime tasks or even transferred to Australian Border Force.
It can be argued that Australia made a major error of judgement in not continuing the construction of Hobart class Air Warfare Destroyers with block upgrades to meet the requirements of a Tier 1 naval surface combatant. In retrospect, this might have been better than switching to an entirely new class of warship based on the UK Type 26 with all of the delays and risks in doing so. Luerssen presents a compelling case for not repeating that mistake.
This means no disrespect to the other designers who have shown an interest in this space, such as tkMS and Navantia. Both can produce extremely capable Corvettes, but the simple fact is that only one company in the form of NVL has a current production line in Australia.
(Disclaimer: Kym Bergmann travelled as a guest of Luerssen. He would like to particularly thank Krystle Thein for her assistance.)
For Editorial Inquiries Contact:
Editor Kym Bergmann at kym.bergmann@venturamedia.net
For Advertising Inquiries Contact:
Director of Sales Graham Joss at graham.joss@venturamedia.net
If a survey was done on the most inefficient, most mired in controversy, bureaucratic department it would be Defence. Time and time again, poor decisions (Seasprite, Taipan, Tiger helicopters plus numerous other projects) combined with a government (this time Labor) that seems to embrace procrastination like a crack addict embracing crack, stifles this country’s ability to acquire any defence project anywhere needed, near on time or on budget.
Everyone, and I mean everyone, knew the pitfalls of the Taipan choppers. I recall a story when they were first placed into service that one was damaged by women’s shoes causing pitting in the floor when being shown to politicians, I kid you not. They were never robust and appeared to break at the drop of a hat. While I appear to be focusing on helicopters, it goes with just about all defence acquisitions. The Arafura class OPV’s seem to have disappeared with none (still) being put into service. The Federal Government has yet another inquiry, this time into the Navy on what type of ships it should acquire, halfway through a build of the Hunter and Arafura classes. While the Army is to receive less than a third of the IFV’s it required and the Air Force does not acquire a single additional fighter jet after the defence review. Like credit cards, the defence of the nation is always on the never never.
When Albanese stated that Navantia had offered an additional 3 Hobart Class AWD’s for a fixed price, I thought that defence pragmatism might win through the politics. How stupid was I. Compare this to Poland who similarly to Australia has a real threat in it’s region and has commenced beefing up it’s military at pace. The disconnect between politicians and defence bureaucrats to the military of this country is now so vast that any chance of our men and women who defend this country getting what they need to do their jobs has become almost unattainable. I know one thing, if Defence and politicians had to have their children or loved ones join the military, this conversation would not be needed. Funny that.
It’s hard to disagree with your summary.
Their claim in regards to Crew Size is highly questionable considering the OPV 90 the Design is based upon requires a crew of 86 with far fewer weapons and systems.
I’m also rather sceptical that such a heavily loaded yet small platform could have anywhere near the range and endurance required by our geography.
Anzac was originally acquired to be a Tier Two combatant with a range of 6,000nm at 18 knots, able to provide Independent and persistent regional presence without tying up finite AORs, and able to keep pace when escorting merchant ships over our great distances.
As long as the proposed Corvette’s are replacing the OPV’s and not future frigates or AWD’s we would gain capability. They would still perform the Arafura’s constabulary/border protection role but could better respond to grey-zone warfare while increasing the number of armed platforms ready to respond at sea.
I’m still mystified as to why the RAN thought it was good idea to scale back the capabilities of the parent design. The situation is so farcical that Saab aren’t allowed to call 9LV on the Arafuras a combat system, it must be referred to as a “situational awareness tool.”
The one pertinent fact that will doom this proposal to complete failure and dispatched to the black hole of DoD archives , is that it makes perfect sense. Luerssen have an everything in place to begin immediately, Supply Lines, a working production line, a skilled workforce, a completed design, everything. As for the completed Arafura several options come to mind, retrofit them to the original design, refit them as Mine Warfare Vessels or Hydrographic Vessels ,transfer them to the ABF or one of our Pacific allies. All it will take is someone to make a decision in Australia’s interest (rather than U.S.interests) . As for Mr Harrisons’ comments on the DoD, don’t get me started….
As I have previously stated the fixation our decision makers have with making ill conceived decisions followed by cancellations is becoming embarrassing.
I have always been of the opinion that the Arafuras were not fit for purpose as a warship however believe that they do have a role as a border force vessel. I agree that corvettes are a good force multiplier but I still believe that the Type 26 project should progress.
I guess that the money that the government is prepared to put into Defence is not consistent with meeting the actual needs of the country which may in the future come back to bite us.
More is always better than less but it would be nice to see a project make it from conception to completion without political interference and give our serving members the equipment – in quantity and quality – they need. Sooner rather than later even better.
Crew size always varies greatly depending on various factors, such as the watch keeping systems and the number of trainees being taken to sea. If you just talk of the bare minimum to take the ship to sea and operate it successfully for a highly automated ship such as the C90 – and others – the number can be quite small.
I don’t think money alone explains the problems in Defence procurement. In the past decade Australia spent at or above 2% of GDP on defence but a lot was wasted.
I also struggle with continuing with Hunters. Not only are they over budget and years late, but they do not meet spec. We know weight has grown >2000 tonnes to fix the stability problem with the radar. Yet engine and fuel bunkerage are the same. So how does Hunter achieve speed and range? Power is also lacking to run all the systems.
I think we would be better off taking up the Navantia offer to build three more Hobarts, a sort of “Batch 2” with AEGIS updated to baseline 9 etc but essentially the same hull and engines. I would say build not 3 more, but 9 more (12 total). Immediate start and probably far cheaper with some economy of scale. Then refit the Batch 1 Hobarts to Batch 2 standard. Hobarts are really small all purpose DDGs with sonar and a good helicopter. This gives a long term program that industry could support with confidence.
We do far too many small bespoke builds of dissimilar designs, for marginal gain, which then become costly to sustain. Anzac succeeded because it was a substantial build (8+2 NZ) of a proven basic hull design. We should bite the bullet and focus on two basic hulls in reasonable numbers – 6+ corvettes and 12 Hobarts. We would be more like Japan, South Korea and USN which have significant numbers in their core classes.
If a time machine existed, it would be best to go back to 2014 when the shipbuilding sector was lobbying like hell for a 4th AWD to avoid the “Valley of Death.” The RAN didn’t want one because it wasn’t part of their Plan. If only that had occurred rather than ordering the Hunter class in 2018 we could have had a continuous program and we wouldn’t be in the mess that we are now.
It is easy for politicians to make these half arsed decisions because it is not them that would go to war with this under equipped vessels.
The distain that this and the previous governments have shown the members of the ADF is disgusting and no wonder there are major recruitment and retention issues.
I implore this government to forget their electioneering and make some real decisions about the defence of this nation.
Just no, no no no.
Stick with the plans that have been made.
The Navy still needs a patrol craft for the mundane patrol tasks that are required around Australia every single day which the new Arafura Offshore Patrol Vessels are a thousand times better than the Armidale class they are replacing. Although the lack of a helicopter hanger is abit of a bummer.
There is also the question of mine warfare with the current Huon class needing replacing very shortly which the Arafura should be more than capable of taking that mission on with the container spaces built into the design for extra mission capabilities.
Re the Hunter programme. Just leave it alone. We don’t need a repeat of the Collins replacement debacle. The Hunter class is hands down the best surface anti-submarine ship ever designed and with it’s silencing measures out classing anything currently on the water or on the design floor. I’m guessing this was the reason the Navy choose it over the stripped down Hobart design which was cheaper and had more VLS.
RAN doctrine is not setup for coastal defense ships. All ships and submarines in service are built around the idea of sinking the enemy along way from Australian Waters.
For coast defense where ships need sinking the Air Force is more than equiped for that job with P-8 Poseidons, and Super Hornets with LRSAM.
The Navy doesn’t need another program based around a small surface combatant, it would be an absurd waste of money that would no doubt mess up alot of other programs.
The Hilarides Review due in September will likely significant change the Navy’s “Plan”. The proposed Corvette’s are just up-gunned Arafura’s with a hanger. They will still serve the same role, but would give Navy increased capability to respond to grey-zone activity and emergent threats. They could potentially significantly increase Navy’s VLS at sea much earlier than the projected 2031/2032 time frame of the first Hunter frigate delivery.
As for the Hunter we can’t “Just leave it alone.” If we had done the same with the Air Warfare Destroyer program we might still be waiting to receive the final ship. Instead we conducted a review, accepted the recommendations to put Navantia in charge and progress improved significantly. While I believe cancelling the program is not in Australia’s best interests, with the program years behind schedule and with billions of dollars invested and little to nothing to show, something has to change. Preferably we spirally develop the Hunter’s to improve their air warfare capabilities and find weight and power savings in Batch 2. BAE should be put on notice that failure to do so would result in cancellation of future batches.
Agree with most of that. I find it astonishing that the current design and mobilisation phase for the Hunter class has a budget of $6.160 billion. In the US the similar exercise to redesign the FREMM to the Constellation class cost about $1.1 billion and was done in 2 years rather than the +5 we are looking at.
Another thought exercise, the Type 31 Frigate programme. 5 Ships, new manufacturing facilities, everything, $3.9 billion Australian Dollars. 2 thirds of the design and mobilisation phase for the Hunter class.
The problem with every Defence project that Australia undertakes (perhaps every is a bit too broad) is the constant interference from Departmental Experts. When you build a house you decide on a design and then leave the Contractor to get on with his job, if you want a Ferrari don’t order a Volkswagon and if you want a Volkswagon don’t expect a Ferrari.
To me, you have to look at what is already in the inventory.
First. Gun. Doesn’t need to be huge, use either the 30mm Turret from the Boxer or the 30mm Turret from the Redback. Both have two rounds of HE Missiles in the form of Spike LR 2 for shots out to the horizon. The Reback turret has a unmanned version that requires no personnel in side and is bolt on to the deck, just add power. The Boxer turret is also being looked at for C-UAV. The gun would be for all close range work, surface and air, manned or not. This would be mounted on the forward section of the A position.
Second. Surface to Air. This should be a NASAM system mounted behind on the gun, but forward to the wheelhouse. Mounted on a quick connect surface mount system. Rather than a 6 box system it could be ungraded to a 9 box, ie another layer.
Third. Surface to Surface. This would be a 4 x NSM launcher. mounted at midships where the Brunei Navy have the Exocets. This would be the same surface mount system used for the Surface to Air system.
Forth: Anti Submarine would be a system mounted in below the flight deck in a container who hold towed sonar and corresponding torpedoes.
While it maynot look it this is for defensive purposes only. To complement the Navy’s other ships will require a different vessel.
This would require very little modifications to the design and build of the current ships except for the surface mounts and the required service connections. Apart from the gun they can all be added on an as needed basis from existing stocks. Also if this requirement changes, ie need for more Surface to Air then remove the Surface to Surface unit and place a second NASAM on the ship.