Officially, the cause of the ditching of a Taipan helicopter with ten people on board on March 22 is still being investigated. Unofficially, details have emerged suggesting the cause is likely to be the failure of Army to implement a fleet-wide software fix to the problem, which first emerged in 2010.
The fundamentals of the accident are known – a night flight that was part of a Special Forces training exercise. While over Jervis Bay the helicopter experienced an engine failure while at low altitude and the pilot carried out what has been called a textbook response, deploying the emergency floatation system, and landing the Taipan on the surface of the sea. This enabled all on board to evacuate safely.
Engine failure on a Taipan is very rare. Each helicopter has two RTM322 Rolls Royce Turbomecca powerplants that are in widespread use not only on the 500 members of the Taipan family, but also on Augusta Westland AW101 transport helicopters and the U.K. Apache fleet – amongst others.
As reliable as they are, in April 2010 a Taipan experienced an engine failure while flying near Adelaide. It was able to return and land at RAAF Base Edinburgh on one engine, but this caused the entire fleet to be grounded for more than three months while an investigation took place. It transpired that the problem was not with the engine itself but rather around the process of restarting it during a mission.
Helicopter turboshaft engines are not meant to be switched on and off repeatedly during an operation. Ideally, you power them up at the start and shut them down at the end – and any idling that might be required in between does not use a huge amount of fuel.
Unfortunately, this had not been communicated to Australian Army pilots – or at least not in the 2010 case – and the helicopter had been subjected to a “hot start” a short time before the in-flight failure. Heat causes metal components to expand at different rates and what had occurred in this case was that moving parts rubbed against each other when they were not meant to, damaging bearings and seals.
This would not have happened if the engines had been allowed to cool down in between missions or if a different process had been followed for their restart, or if they had been running continuously.
By July 2010 the prime contractor Airbus Helicopters and Safran – the corporate parent of the engine – had developed a software fix that would make it impossible for a pilot to incorrectly perform a “hot start.” The Taipan is a complex helicopter with a modern fly-by-wire flight control system using multiple computers, and having the latest software is a vital ingredient for their performance.
This means that software updates are a regular part of supporting the Taipan fleet – but bizarrely Army only agreed to the engine fix being applied to an initial small number of helicopters, apparently because of concerns about the cost.
Engine failure in flight is an extremely serious event, putting the lives of all on board at risk. The 2010 software fix should have been applied to all 47 Australian helicopters, irrespective of how much money was involved. At the very least this should have been done for reasons of commonality – it’s a problem waiting to happen if pilots believe they are flying one version of a helicopter when it turns out that they are at the controls of something different.
It seems highly probable that the Taipan forced to ditch into Jervis Bay had not received the vital software update that should have been installed a decade ago. It is understood that it underwent just such a “hot start” prior to the ditching. Thanks to its emergency floatation system not only was everyone able to get out, but the helicopter itself was towed to a beach – to the delight of the media – fuelling more stories about the unreliability of the Taipan fleet, with pictures to match.
The Blackhawk helicopters being purchased to replace them do not have emergency floatation systems and if they ditch, they quickly sink.
Another perversity in the Australian system is that the performance-based logistics contract imposed on Airbus means that Defence makes money every time a helicopter is grounded. This gives the customer a financial incentive to keep the helicopters on the tarmac because penalties kick in for every flight hour that has been lost.
Combined with inherent problems in Army logistic systems and a failure to retain experienced mechanics, a picture emerges that is completely at odds with the common view that there is something inherently wrong with the helicopters.
This reputational damage has resulted in ridiculous events such as flights being stopped while Army investigated the use of cadmium for the helicopter’s external hook. Cadmium is a metal in widespread use throughout military and commercial aviation and in solid form poses no risk to humans whatsoever. Despite this, Army insisted on the construction of a unique cadmium-free hook.
By this and other devices – such as simply not ordering enough spare parts – Army has been able to drive up the cost per flight hour of the Taipan fleet either deliberately or through error to truly astronomical levels. These inflated costs have provided the justification for retiring the entire fleet about 20 years ahead of schedule.
This is not to say that the Taipans have been trouble free. They have not been, especially in their early years – but this is quite common with modern, complex platforms. As APDR has frequently reported, most international customers have been happy with their fleets – though Norway is trying to return theirs, with Sweden and Belgium possibly in the same boat. The majority of users, including France, Germany and Italy have not experienced abnormal difficulties.
Let’s hope that the findings of the current investigation are made public – but don’t hold your breath. Army has form in this regard – in 2016 Defence organised an independent review into the reliability of the Taipan and Tiger fleets. Known as the Houston Review, it is believed to have been critical of Army processes because its findings were instantly classified and have been buried ever since.
Only a handful of people have ever seen the document and if Army has their way it will be hidden forever. It seems that nothing will be allowed to deflect the $11 billion process of replacing Taipan and Tiger with older generation U.S. helicopters.
An outline of this story was provided to Defence more than a week ago in the hope of receiving answers to several questions. After deadline, the following official response was received:
“The investigation into the MRH90 ditching is ongoing.”
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Regardless of how good a piece or kit is Unless it has a made in the USA sticker on it the powers that be in Canberra will find something wrong it. The Army wanted Blackhawks and Apaches ,no matter how good the Taipan and Tiger were they were determined to find a way to get them.So far we have committed to a Fighter that doesn’t have sufficient range to pose a serious threat, an MBT that is to heavy to be deployed quickly in sufficient numbers to be useful, Mobile Missile launchers dependant on missiles supplied overseas and a Submarine that has a crew twice the size of the ones we’re having trouble crewing . All because,If the USA says they’ll sell them to us we have to have them. It is ludicrous that politics drive the thinking on equipment we purchase. A lot of kit we get from the US is fit for purpose and is very good but time and time again an excellent deal goes in the waste bin because it’s not made in the USA. ( a point in question is the Sth Korean offer of the Chunmoo system ).
There also seems to be another outbreak of anti-Australian industry sentiment. This moves in circles and at the moment the Import Everything From The USA faction must be ascendant.
If the Army is stupid enough to believe in global warming, they’re stupid enough to do anything.
I have no idea what your comment has to do with the Taipan ditching story but I’ll let it go through in case readers can see a connection that I cannot.
Is not a software problem. The hardware should be strongly considered well before software. The software is the fluffy stuff. So glad that it landed safely. They should never go down. We’re the propellant too light weight?
One wonders whether operational responsibility for helos should have been left with the RAAF.
Certainly maintenance should have been. I’ve had Army people say that to me until 2018, at which point it became a career limiting move to say anything positive about either Tiger or Taipan.
Lol no. Typical salty old Raffie comment.
The RAAF aren’t super maintainers. They go to the same maintenance school as army and have to comply with the same airworthiness standards.
Who is the airworthiness authority for Army aircraft?
A very good question. I don’t know but I shall ask. I’m guessing the Defence Aviation Safety Authority. It would be very interesting to check their role in Taipan groundings.
How many engine failures have occurred with terrible aircraft?
Just a quick google search in English found these. I’m sure there are far more!
Australia – 2010
Germany – 2014
NZ – 2017
Australia – 2023
I’m not sure what your point is. All engines and aircraft sometimes have problems. A few days ago a Japanese Blackhawk crashed with 10 dead: https://www.cbsnews.com/news/japan-helicopter-crash-army-black-hawk-missing-near-miyako-island/
Does that mean Blackhawks are bad? No it does not. The Blackhawk is a superb helicopter. It’s important to understand the full picture rather than jumping to conclusions.
I was actually saying … how many engines failures have occurred on this aircraft?
At its small fleet world wide hours, it would no longer be meeting 10 to the minus 9 requirements for its engine certification.
Does NZ have this software update?
I believe NZ has the software update, but I’m checking.
I question the validity of this so called inside information!
Until I see the offical report all this noise is just conjecture which does nothing but make up headlines which later on seem to disappear when the true facts are released.
I see no value Chinese whispers, it’s also find it extremely hard to believe given the money and effort put into this programme by both parties that expensive defence equipment let alone lives would have been put at risk for 13 years!!
My understanding was that the 2010 issue was to addressed with both software and changed pilot training/operating start up and shut down procedures
Either revel the source for this so called information and provide real facts or wait like everyone else for an offical report
This is poor journalism
I’m all for full disclosure – and let’s start with the 2016 Houston report.
The MRH 90 is a fantastic aircraft and used well by NZ and other European countries. ARH Tiger the same point can be made.
There is nothing wrong with the aircraft. The inherent problem is that the Army’s core focus is not and never will be aircraft focused like the RAAF. The RAAF’s core focus is to provide air power everyday of the year which makes any maintenance on aircraft a #1 priority eg software update. Army is soldier first everything else second, understandably. Some of the spare parts problems Australia suffer with is there own doing not signing up to global spares system to save money
European aircraft are toxic to defence atm maybe Defence (government) are aligning themselves politically more with the USA and moving away from their European counterparts (sub decision)
The Black Hawk and Apache fleets will be no more serviceable than the current fleet and will have the same challenges.
The major challenge will be retaining a uniformed maintenance team.
Thanks for your thoughts. I couldn’t have said it better myself.
If they are such a great aircraft, why are the Germans getting rid of the Tiger, the Swedes, the Norwegians and one or two other users getting rid of the NH90’s? They never performed in the manner the manufacturer claimed and before I get the, “but it’s the marinised NH90’s that the Swedes and Norwegians are dumping”, the fact is they are fundamentally the same aircraft as we have and they never have performed in the manner that the manufacturer claimed. I will agree that the ability to have floatation devices probably saved lives and possibly the chopper (if it has not been destroyed by salt water inundation).
I don’t think that correct about them not performing as claimed. So far, 500 have been built and the vast majority of users are satisfied with their NH90s. As I understand it, the Germans aren’t replacing Tigers – they are augmenting them with less expensive H-145Ms for certain missions. The Norwegian NH90 case is unique – they wanted their own dipping sonar and their own lightweight torpedoes, which has been a program management disaster. Sweden is unhappy with theirs – but they decided for unknown reasons that the already roomy cabin (far larger than for a Blackhawk) needed the ceiling raised by another 20 centimetres, or something like that. They are staying with the program for the moment.
They also have a modern 4-axis flight control system while Blackhawks continue to use mechanical controls of 1970s vintage. The entire commercial world moved to fly-by-wire 30 years ago because the controls are not only cheaper but far more reliable and therefore far safer. This always puzzled me until a knowledgeable insider explained Army’s attitude: “They don’t want a modern fancy SUV, they want to go back to a Holden ute.”
That’s as good a summary as I have heard – and it’s costing Australian taxpayers $11 billion (Apache + Blackhawk) to keep them happy, without any scrutiny whatsoever.
They are ditching the NH-90s due to supply chain issues. Nothing to do with A/C capability
I think it’s more complex than that – and I’ve written a lot on the topic. A number of other users – such as New Zealand – have had far fewer problems than Australia. I think a better expression would be: Defence mismanagement of supply chain issues.
So go back to a report made 9 years ago!!!
I’ve worked in manufacturing heavy industry my entire life half of that in management roles and I can tell you no report written 9 years ago will be any use to anything happening today.
Reports are only good for the time they are written after that they are history out of date straight after they are printed.
The whole ditching of the Taipan helicopters seems very strange to me. It seems more about money laundering by US influence than a logical choice of capability. Reading about some of the very basic complaints that the government has expressed about the aircraft such as cartridge cases from the machine guns ejecting into the cabin, or the seats not being wide enough, or a storage compartment in the cabin coming loose are laughable at best. When I hear the government and military state these issues as though they are irreparable makes me question our countries competence. The engines used in the Taipan are also the same as those used in the Blackhawk, or at least an alternative. There is also no mention of the Blackhawks safety record. The Blackhawk has had far more crashes and deaths. If the internet is accurate, the Blackhawk has had over 400 deaths not attributed to war time use. At the time of this article being written there have also been articles written about the Blackhawk questioning its safety record as it has claimed 60 lives in the last 10 years. Not a single mention of that from our government, military or media. Australia seems to be owned by the US while they push the anti-China drum. I’m building my first experimental helicopter here in Australia, and although not as large or capable as the apache in terms of armament, it exceeds it in range and possibly in speed. I could produce 620 for the price of one Crapache, which would make them far more capable. The issue with hot starting an engine also, well that is well known for turbine engines and should be avoided. This just makes me think our pilots are not very competent either, what happens if we do go to war.
Thanks John – interesting thoughts. You are correct about the excellent safety record of Taipan and I’m appalled by ongoing attempts by the Australian Army – repeated by the government – linking supposed safety issues with its retirement. Unfortunately the implication that they are unsafe has been repeated so many times the general population might have absorbed that message. I’ll have quite a bit more to say on this shortly with several simultaneous lines of inquiry.
Good luck with your experimental helicopter project. Can you say a bit more about it?
Over a year since A40-025 Taipan ditched in Jarvis Bay and still no investigation findings released by Defence. Media speculations (APDR) that post engine fail event, the good engine was inadvertently shut down, while airborne and contributed to the ditching, have not been verified. Will the ADF investigating body release their full findings on the Jarvis Bay MRH90 accident, given the relationship to the ongoing inquiry into the Hamilton Island crash? Or will the findings be classified, as it does not align with the narrative that the Taipan was unsafe.
There is no reason for the findings not to be released.
These reports take far too long.
It took 17 months to release the accident report into the loss of a Growler on take-off from Amberley. The cause of that mishap was known on day 1 of the investigation.
An MH-60R ditched in the Philippine Sea in October 2021. No one seems vexed by the absence of that accident investigation report after 31 months.
By all means demand a quicker response from Defence Accident Investigators, but let’s not pretend this problem is unique to MHR90.
I agree completely. This culture of coverups has to end.
Indifference to the media is not evidence of a ‘culture of coverups’.
Really? It’s certainly not a culture of openness and transparency – unlike the situation in many comparable countries. Let’s hope the report into the Nowra ditching is made public – but it won’t be because the full circumstances are extremely embarrassing for Army. I know because I have a very good idea of exactly what occurred.
You often talk about how Army is or will be embarrassed by Taipan. They aren’t, and they won’t be, because there’s nothing to be embarrassed about.
Accident investigations are not about personal or organisational reputation. They are about understanding what went wrong and preventing a recurrence.
What then is the reason for keeping the report into the Nowra ditching hidden? Or classifying the 2016 Houston report into maintenance issues Top Secret, guaranteeing that it will never see the light of day?
as we saw on 4Corners ABC TV there was a computer software problem in the pilot’s helmets that helped with IFR navigation. Allegedly incorrectcomputer update involved giving pilot wrong info resulting in unsafe navigation
I’ve reported on the same thing. It’s a theory currently being investigated, for which there is some indirect evidence.
The Houston report was not about maintenance issues. It included comments about maintenance but it was far wider. Its classification -SECRET- was entirely appropriate given its scope.
I’m sure the JB report will be publicly released. Every single other ADF accident report has had a public release, there’s no reason to believe this one will be different.
Thanks. How about a redacted version of the Houston report? Surely it doesn’t all have to be suppressed.