That was quick. Just a few days ago Australia was in the process of spending $50 billion – in 2016 dollars – on the most advanced conventional submarine in the region, if not the world. We know this because that is what everyone from the Prime Minister down – and including Defence and Foreign Affairs Ministers, Admirals and Departmental Secretaries – have been insisting was the case since 2016.
Now Prime Minister Morrison tells us that the submarines are lemons and would have been obsolete as soon as they hit the water. Where is the RAN – and all their highly paid US advisors – in all of this? Like any prime contractor, Naval Group has been working at the direction of Defence, not the other way around. Surely if $3 billion and five years of effort has been spent on an obsolete product people need to be held to account.
Similarly with the schedule, everyone had continued to insist that the program was on track with steel to be cut for the first boat in 2023 and delivered a decade later. That also has changed in just a few days, with the Prime Minister saying that the initial boat would not have been launched until 2038 – which means that the first of class Attack, following extensive sea trials, would probably not have been accepted into service for another two years after that. This would have set a world record for the least efficient submarine enterprise ever. Who has been covering up this shambles?
The Joint Communique issued by the Defence and Foreign Affairs Ministers of Australia and France issued on August 21 said in part:
“Both sides committed to deepen defence industry cooperation and enhance their capability edge in the region. Ministers underlined the importance of the Future Submarine program. They agreed to strengthen military scientific research cooperation through a strategic partnership between the Defence Science and Technology Group and the Directorate General for Armaments.”
This was a mere 25 days before the AUKUS announcement. The document is available in full here.
Something similar has happened with our broader relationship with France. We have gone from trusted allies and long-term partners with mutual interests in the Asia-Pacific to now having the respective heads of government exchanging insults and making accusations against each other. To read the analysis of the conservative Australian media and listen to some Defence insiders, the vitriol – in some cases pure hatred – is such that one wonders why they have been silent the last five years. If the French are so bad and untrustworthy, why did we sign a contract with them in the first place?
Referring again to the communique referred to above:
“Ministers reaffirmed the shared values, interests and principles that underpin the bilateral relationship, as reflected in the Joint Statement of Enhanced Strategic Partnership between Australia and France, and the Vision Statement on the Australia-France Relationship. They agreed to publish a report on the Australia-France initiative (AFiniti) to highlight the depth and breadth of cooperative activities.”
WHO HAS BEEN LYING?
Clearly there is a lot to try and understand in all of this and the complete story might never be known. Without being in possession of the full facts it is difficult to make firm judgements – but we can make some guesses. Prime Minister Morrison has given several accounts of the dinner with President Macron in June during which he says he told his counterpart that the submarine contract would be terminated. Macron asserts that no such thing was said and that France was oblivious to the dramatic switch that was about to occur.
These two different versions are compatible and do not indicate that either Morrison or Macron have been lying. It all gets down to the exact words that were used and in what context. It happens all the time and neither individual is deliberately stating a falsehood. Person A: “You didn’t show up on Friday”; Person B: “You said next Friday, not this Friday.”
Perhaps a message of the enormous consequences of cancelling a strategic partnership worth tens of billions of dollars between two nations should not have been delivered casually during a friendly dinner, perhaps with a few glasses of alcohol involved. Whatever message the Australian Prime Minister thought he was delivering, the French President heard something different. We know this from the now infamous leaked “is it good news or bad news” text from Macron a couple of days before everything went public on September 16.
WHY NOT A 4-WAY ALLIANCE?
One of the great mysteries is why there was no attempt to structure a relationship between France, Australia, the US and the UK. All four countries are already connected via various security arrangements, not the least of which being NATO for the three northern hemisphere countries. The Attack class submarine is already a tri-nation undertaking with a US nuclear submarine combat system, the AN/BYG-1 from Lockheed Martin and US weapons, principally the Mk 48 heavyweight torpedo in a French hull for an Australian customer.
One of the paperwork chores when the project was first established was to put in place the necessary security protocols and procedures so that French, Australian and US personnel could share Top Secret data. A number of them have been co-located in the Attack class design centre in Cherbourg. Adding the UK to the mix would have been administratively simple. Such a group might have been able to conclude that the best solution was to fast track the Australian version of a nuclear-powered Barracuda – which already exists – perhaps with the first of class built in France.
NAVAL REACTORS
As we have previously written, there is a quite a bit of misinformation about naval nuclear reactors, particularly the assertion that US and UK systems are far superior because they never need to be refuelled. This might be true, but they still need to be thoroughly inspected regularly, itself an intrusive process that is inherently risky because the material, highly enriched bomb grade Uranium 235, is completely toxic to humans if it leaks out. Each Virginia or Astute class submarine is powered by about 300kg of the stuff, enough to make a dozen or so nuclear weapons. There is still a very long way to go in legal and regulatory matters if Australia is ever to receive such technology.
French reactors use commercial grade Low Enriched Uranium and need to be refuelled every ten years. Various Australians, including the Prime Minister and Defence Minister, have said this is a no-no because refuelling them is a complex and dangerous process – and that if it had to be done in France this would be an unacceptable risk to national sovereignty. This might be true, but it seems at least worth exploring in a bit more detail. The French have developed a highly automated process that can be completed in three weeks, some sources say a few days, and it would be interesting to see if that technology could be transferred to Australia.
The bottom line is that refuelling a reactor with LEU is not that much more dangerous than the regular safety inspections that are needed for one using HEU.
UNTRUE OFFICIAL STATEMENTS
There are some other untruths being uttered about the supposed superiority in all regards of nuclear- powered submarines over conventional ones. This is a clumsy retrospective attempt to make the diesel-electric Attack class look unacceptably bad. In an opinion piece published in the Australian Financial Review on October 26, Defence Minister Dutton wrote:
“Compared to their conventional counterparts these submarines are superior in terms of stealth, speed, manoeuvrability, endurance and survivability. Nuclear-powered submarines can carry a greater number of advanced weapons and deploy underwater vehicles. There’s also significant interoperability advantages in working with the UK and US.”
He is wrong on several counts:
- Nuclear submarines are not stealthier. This is factually incorrect. At all speeds, particularly slow and stationary, nuclear submarines are noisier, mainly because of the need to cool their reactors;
- Nuclear submarines are not more manoeuvrable. They are large and not particularly agile – certainly not compared with a Collins class or smaller vessels;
- The endurance of a submarine is limited by the amount of food that can be carried for the crew and the amount of time that people can be confined underwater in a large metal tube without going insane. A nuclear submarine certainly has the capacity to carry a lot more supplies than a conventional one, but human mental frailty means that missions of more than 70 days for either type are unlikely.
- The reason why Collins currently and the future Attack class use the AN/BYG-1 combat system and Mk 48 torpedoes is to maximise commonality with the US. This commonality therefore already exists. There is no commonality with UK submarines, which have their own combat system and weapons.
- Nuclear submarines can deploy uninhabited vessels, but so can conventional submarines. There is no difference.
The Minister is new to the portfolio and next time might wish to have his article fact checked by experts before submitting it for publication.
INDISCRETION RATES AND MORE FALSE INFORMATION
As if the piece in the AFR isn’t bad enough when it comes to misleading the public, a lot has been said about the supposed weakness of conventional submarines because of their indiscretion rate. This is a consequence of their need to come near the surface to put up the snort mast, which sucks in huge quantities of air when the diesel engines are running to charge the battery pack.
A lot of work has been done on developing stealth masts that are undetectable by radar and EO systems. Secondly, there is a great deal of junk floating around on the sea surface that has signatures similar to those given off by submarines. Thirdly, skilled submariners move their vessels at the same speed and direction as the waves so that there is no tell-tale wake. Finally, the diesels only need to be run for a short time and have an acoustic signature very similar if not identical to thousands of merchant vessels and fishing boats chugging around all the time.
Conventional submarines can be made stealthier by the use of Air Independent Propulsion and lithium ion batteries. The RAN – and especially the highly paid US advisors referred to earlier – have shown no interest in either. France and Naval Group cannot be blamed for that. These are entirely Australian decisions – and backward ones at that.
Another thing that no one is pointing out is that nuclear submarines also come to the surface. That is why they have numerous masts, including periscopes and radar / ESM systems. These wonderful pieces of technology only work when they are poked up into the air to see what is going on. Submarines have an attack periscope because the captain likes to verify a target before blowing it out of the water in case it’s a hospital ship or a friendly vessel. Imagine the embarrassment of sinking one’s own flagship by mistake.
When a nuclear submarine comes to the surface to put up its masts, it is just as vulnerable to detection as a conventional one. It has the option of staying underwater the entire time, but if it does that why bother with all those fancy masts in the first place?
Nuclear submarines have the advantage that they can run at high speed underwater for extended periods of time, but even this needs to be qualified. Because of the noise caused by hydrodynamic flow, the faster a submarine travels the less its sonars can detect anything in the area because of the vast rush of water over its own arrays. This means that there must be a compromise between high speed and situational awareness – you can have one or the other, but not both.
DEFENCE’S SELF-DEFEATING INFORMATION BLACKOUT
In words dear to the heart of APDR, French Ambassador Jean-Pierre Thebault told the National Press Club on November 3 that he felt the Department of Defence had concealed positive information about the Attack class program to make it easier to cancel it. He said:
“We have questioned the Australian government several times over the years about the false and misleading allegations which have been regularly made – with scarce official response. We were told: such things are normal in Australia, go away – and have to be managed by Defence.
“But in light of subsequent events, the question arises: why was it not possible earlier to state the basic truth about the program?”
The Ambassador is referring to clear statements during Senate Estimates and earlier hearings involving senior Defence officials who stated repeatedly that the Attack class program was on time and on budget.
“Why was the smear campaign not stopped? In retrospect and knowing what we know today – and I thank the press – about the relentless conduct of an alternative plan, some had an interest in sabotaging public support for the Attack class program.”
The handling by Defence of information about the Attack class has indeed been abysmal, hiding behind the cloak of national security to say nothing about it publicly. But things have gone much further, with the French and Naval Group saying that they have been blocked by the Department from having any contact with the Australian media.
If true, this is a disgrace and should have resulted in the Naval Group CEO writing the following letter:
Dear Minister,
It has come to my attention that your officials are attempting to prevent communication between Naval Group and the media. If correct, such actions are in breach of the Trade Practices Act, which makes it unlawful for a government to stop a company going about its usual lawful commercial activities. We have the right – within the bounds of military and commercial sensitive information – to communicate in general terms about our activities.
By attempting to muzzle us, the Department is not protecting matters of national security – it is seeking to hide its own deficiencies.
We will continue with our usual marketing activities and if Defence would like to have a representative present at all briefings to make sure that nothing untoward happens, it is welcome to do so – at its own cost.
Finally, if you have been a party to the suppression of unclassified positive information about the project you might also be personally liable for the consequences of your actions.
Yours sincerely,
POSSIBLE LEGAL CONSEQUENCES
If the cancelled Attack class contract ends up in court – as well as it might – Naval Group could have a huge financial claim against Defence for trashing the company’s international reputation and thereby costing it billions of dollars in foregone revenue.
Lawyers would be salivating at the prospect of running a case if there is written proof that Defence has been blocking the release of unclassified, positive information about the performance of the company.
Make no mistake – the international arms trade is huge and competition is fierce. Without doubt, the many competitors of Naval Group will be capitalising on the Australian decision and will be gleefully repeating the words of various Ministers who have been seeking to damage the company for several weeks.
Perhaps this is why Defence officials have been far more circumspect, saying that the cancellation has nothing to do with contractual performance and everything to do with changed international circumstances. However, these words cannot undo the damage caused by years of suppressing any good news.
THE WAY AHEAD
Build a fleet of Next Generation Collins class submarines in Adelaide and repeat the original highly successful formula of a US combat system and French sonars and French optronic masts.
The experts consider Collins to be the most potent conventional submarine in the world. Stop wasting any more time and build more of them.
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Well argued analysis.
Dear Mr Bergmann,
Reading your summary of your biography in APDR, I acknowledge your 25 years of experience in journalism and the defence industry, however it is evident from the content of your writing that you have no actual experience of submarines. I do not know from whom you obtain advice regarding submarines, but I suggest you look elsewhere.
I have been the Commanding Officer of RAN submarines and was the Commander of the Submarine Force for four years. I have been in British and American nuclear powered submarines, I have exercised against them and I have confronted other nuclear powered submarines while on operational deployments.
In regards to comments made by Minister Dutton, you said, “Nuclear submarines are not stealthier. This is factually incorrect. At all speeds, particularly slow and stationary, nuclear submarines are noisier, mainly because of the need to cool their reactors”. This is one of the myths about nuclear powered submarines that was only true of boats designed and built in the 1960s and 1970s. Modern nuclear powered submarines are very quiet. The coolant pumps for modern nuclear reactors are no noisier and probably quieter than the hydraulic pumps, air conditioning machines and ventilation in conventional and nuclear powered submarines. Operating this equipment is essential in both nuclear and conventional submarines, including when evading other submarines or ASW forces. That is, there is no effective noise distinction between modern submarines of the two propulsion options, except that the conventional submarine is much noisier when operating diesel engines to recharge batteries.
You said, “Nuclear submarines are not more manoeuvrable. They are large and not particularly agile – certainly not compared with a Collins class or smaller vessels”. It is true that nuclear submarines are, in general, not more maneuverable, but nor are they, in general, less maneuverable. Speed through the water has the most significant effect on the rate at which submarines turn or change depth and nuclear submarines have higher speed available than conventional submarines. This speed advantage of nuclear powered submarines may be slightly offset by large size, but not necessarily. The type of control surfaces, such as the cruciform stern fins in the Collins class and the overall beam to length ratio influence maneuverability. The Oberon class submarines that Australia acquired in the 1970s were considerably less manouverable than American and British SSNs of that era.
Furthermore, while the two SSN design options being considered for the RAN are larger than the cancelled Attack class, nuclear submarines do not necessarily have to be large. The American and British submarines prior to the USN Los Angles class were in the size range of the Collins and Attack classes. Nuclear submarines have gotten larger so as to carry more weapons, have larger sonar arrays and have sufficient crew to facilitate less exhausting watch keeping than in conventional boats. As for being, “not particularly agile”, it is not evident to me what this has to do with the nuclear/conventional debate. Even if it were true, which it isn’t, a patrol boat may be more agile than an Air Warfare Destroyer, however that is not a justification for a navy consisting only of patrol boats.
I am particularly concerned about your playing down the vulnerability of diesel submarines due to the requirement for them to recharge batteries, the indiscretion rate. When a conventional submarine has to transit long distances between their home base and their patrol area, a balance has to be achieved between maximum time on station in the patrol area and vulnerability resulting from excessively high indiscretion ratio while transiting to or from that patrol area. As the average speed of the transit increases, so does the indiscretion ratio. A modern conventional submarine transiting long distance at an average speed of 10 knots, typical of a low threat environment, might have an indiscretion ratio of 50 per cent, that is, it would need to spend about 12 of every 24 hours snorting. In a higher threat environment, the average transit speed might be reduced to about six knots with an indiscretion ratio of about 20 per cent, operating diesels about five hours each day. Once in their patrol area, submarines might not need to use much speed and the indiscretion ratio might be less than 10 per cent, however if bursts of high speed are used to either pursue targets of interest or to conduct evasion, the indiscretion ratio would increase dramatically.
A diesel submarine is far more vulnerable to detection when snorting than nuclear powered submarines free from that requirement. You said, “A lot of work has been done on developing stealth masts that are undetectable by radar and EO systems. Secondly, there is a great deal of junk floating around on the sea surface that has signatures similar to those given off by submarines”. True, masts have been made more stealthy, although none are undetectable and the radar and EO sensors of ASW platforms have also improved accordingly. The advantage is still with the submarine, however snort masts generate a larger radar and EO signature than periscopes and are therefore more detectable. There is not as much ‘floating junk’ as you assume and junk does not suddenly disappear when aircraft close to investigate and classify.
“Thirdly, skilled submariners move their vessels at the same speed and direction as the waves so that there is no tell-tale wake”. I must be less skilled than I thought as the practice you describe has never been one I have used or been taught. The direction of travel is usually dictated by the mission and where the submarine is moving to. In any case, sometimes the surface of the South China Sea and other tropical waters is like a breathless mirror surface. When there is wind and waves, snorting in the same direction as the wind is problematic as it causes the toxic diesel exhaust to be sucked back into the induction mast and back into the submarine and is to be avoided wherever possible. In higher sea states, if the mission situation permits, submarine CO’s will attempt to move at right angles to the wind and sea when at periscope depth as it is easier to maintain the necessary precision depth control.
The US Department of Defence has developed very good processes for determining the cost effectiveness of various platform and weapons system options. Some years ago they determined that it was not cost effective for their large aircraft carriers to have conventional propulsion and they have not built one since the 1960s. They experimented with a few nuclear powered cruisers and abandoned it as not cost effective. The USN has assessed that it is currently still just cost effective for the 45,000t LHAs to be conventional, however they know the oil price point at which nuclear power will be more cost effective. Another example is that they determined it is still cost effective to operate B52 aircraft that are 60+ years old.
The Americans determined in the 1950s that nuclear propulsion is more cost effective for submarines than conventional propulsion. They have considered conventional propulsion several times since, reviewing all the new air independent technology and still conclude nuclear is the way to go. The British and French reached the same conclusion as the Americans. Non nuclear air independent propulsion and/or lithium ion batteries are attractive options for nations whose likely submarine patrol areas are a short distance from their home port or for those with no access to a nuclear option. That is, those technologies might be adequate for nations on the Baltic Sea, Mediterranean Sea, Yellow Sea and Sea of Japan, however they are not cost effective for Australia where we are confronted with a need to travel great distances to likely patrol areas.
“Build a fleet of Next Generation Collins class submarines…..” and “The experts consider Collins to be the most potent conventional submarine in the world”. Whatever a ‘next generation Collins class’ would be, as with the cancelled Attack class it would be inferior to China’s nuclear powered submarines. We would not expect our RAAF pilots to go into advanced air combat in turboprop driven fighters in lieu of more cost effective 5th generation jets, so why should we expect young Australians to go to war in inferior submarines?
I invite you to test my statements above with any other current or recent command qualified submariner. You are dangerously spreading misinformation.
Thank you for all of that additional detail – I’m happy to continue the debate. A slight irony in this is that one of the smallest nuclear attack submarines is the Rubis class – predecessor of the Barracuda – built by, you guessed it, France. The choice for Australia, as confirmed to the Senate during estimates will not be a hybrid or a submarine specifically designed for Australia but will be a straight choice between a Virginia class and an Astute. Regarding various noise levels, a conventional submarine still has the option of shutting off almost everything and just running the minimum amount of equipment necessary for life, but you can’t do that with a reactor. If the case for nuclear submarines is so overwhelming I am struggling to understand why the RAN has just spent 5 years and $3 billion designing a conventional boat and also why as a nation we will be extending the life of the conventionally powered Collins for another 20 or 30 years. If they are as deficient as you argue they won’t be able to go anywhere near contested waters such as the South China Sea and spending another few billion on them will be a complete waste of money.
Also my comment about manoeuvrability was in response to Minister Dutton’s claim that nuclear submarines were always superior. You must be familiar with Collins and ISCMMS. The larger the submarine, the greater the surface area for active sonar to detect – it’s the same principle as radar: all other things being equal, a big thing is easier to detect than a small one.
The relatively small Rubis class was France’s first SSN, although they were preceded by nuclear powered ballistic missile submarines. When compared with British and American SSNs, the Rubis were relatively noisy. Like the British and Americans, the French appear to have learned that greater size brings benefits that outweigh negatives. One of those benefits of size is the ability to incorporate a variety of noise reduction features. The very large ballistic missile submarines of the USN and RN are actually quieter than the natural background noise of the ocean across most of the sound frequency spectrum. Furthermore, the extra size allows thicker anechoic coatings to reduce the signature of the submarines when confronted by low frequency active sonar.
As for, “a conventional submarine still has the option of shutting off almost everything”, I’ve been there, done that and learned my lesson. In tropical waters the elements of the combat system very quickly overheat and degrade, especially the sonar performance. Some systems, such as hydraulic pumps are required in order to operate control surfaces, that is hydroplanes and rudder/cruciform, for course and depth control.
The American and British SSNs are the best options for Australia in view of our reliance on nation of the selected design when it comes to the fuel for the reactor. This is not the first time Australia and France have had a diplomatic spat and probably won’t be the last. We could not risk being reliant on France for the nuclear fuel for our future submarines, noting that French boats need refueling a few times during their life, not required with the other two options. The American option in particular brings a range of strategic benefits for Australia, however the UK boats are also very good.
Why have we spent five years designing a conventional boat? At the time that replacements for Australia’s Oberon class submarines were being developed in the 1980’s, it is almost certain that neither the USA nor UK would have sold nuclear submarines to Australia. With the cold war at its peak, their focus was on the USSR and the possibility of maritime warfare in the North Atlantic. France was just starting to develop their first nuclear powered attack submarines. But what about when it came time to explore options to replace the Collins class submarines? The 2009 Defence White paper announced that the Collins class would be replaced and Australia’s submarine force would be expanded to 12 boats. The Minister for Defence at the time, Joel Fitzgibbon, directed the department that in developing options, they were not to bring forward any nuclear option. Three years later when he was no longer Defence Minister, Fitzgibbon admitted it was a mistake ruling out a nuclear option, however neither of his successors as Labor Defence Ministers altered the ‘no nuclear’ guidance to the department. Consequently, when the Coalition government came to power in 2013, only conventional options had been developed.
Five years ago, at the time of 2016 Defence White Paper, our strategic circumstances did not look quite as rosy as in 2009, but also not over alarming. That soon changed when Xi Jinping and his Wolf Warriors began showing their true colours, which led to the need for the 2020 Defence Strategic Update. I do not know, but suspect, that it was in the context of developing the 2020 Update that the need to explore the possibility of nuclear powered submarines emerged. Not knowing if nuclear power would be possible, the design effort had to continue for the conventional Attack class.
Prime Minister Morrison’s 16th September media release was clear that the decision was because “…accelerating changes to regional security make conventional submarines unsuited to our operational needs in the decades ahead”. In other words, Australia would probably have continued with the inferior Attack class submarines if nuclear powered submarines were not viable. AUKUS has rendered nuclear power viable.
Whilst the Americans are our allies and mates, there should be no doubt that the change of heart in the USA about helping Australia acquire nuclear submarines is because they have concluded it is in their national interest to do so. Xi Jinping has created this environment and because of the actions of the Chinese Communist government. The future maritime battle space is far more likely to be the western Pacific, not the North Atlantic as when the Americans assisted the Brits to transition to nuclear powered submarines. The Americans are likely to attach some urgency to Australia’s nuclear submarine force to bolster their own forces in the Indo-Pacific. That is, they are likely to help us get our first nuclear submarines as soon as possible.
The Collins class are good enough for now. Even with the life extension, they will commence being withdrawn from service about 2038 and will all be retired by 2048. Had we continued with the Attack class, the 12th boat would not have entered service until about 2053 and been in service until the 2080s.
Sir, Thank you for such an erudite reply especially in the light of your distinguished experience. As a ‘land lubber’ I can only rely peer reviwed literature to put forth my views.
For one, I find it discomfiting that conventional subs are being virtually ruled out as an option in favour of a all nuclear fleet. As I see it, it is less a question of either or and more a question of what undersea and over sea capabilities are needed to meet what the PLA-N is likely to throw at its adversaries.
Australia has a huge EEZ of little over 8 million sq.km implying that UUVs (for ISR, mine laying, other coastal defense), specialised midget subs, inner EEZ coastal subs such as the Type 206, outer EEZ/open sea capable conventional subs ala Type 209/Taigei etc. might be necessary to counter PLA-N undersea. While western bloc support might be given, imho, Australia will need a mix of the above all assets plus n-powered fast attacks for operating in the western pacific or in the Indian ocean.
In a combat scenario, I doubt if big n-boats can hide in many shallow parts of the SCS within the first island chain. The US Navy seems to allude to precisely this possibility.(Not to mention despite Virginia class being technically littoral water capable, it is something apparently not desired for technical and operational purposes).
https://www.usni.org/magazines/proceedings/2018/june/theres-case-diesels
Your writing also seems to ignore the extremely skittish reaction that Australia’s public has had to the ‘N’ word in the past. Without a civilian nuclear infrastructure and long lead times to develop adequate naval crew and operational/technical support manpower, I wonder how Australia can manage to build, maintain and run 8 fast attacks. In India, it took us 32 years from 1984 to 2016 for the nuclear program to finally start chugging at a steady pace. The relatively short timeline also reflects how India’s civilian infra at Kalpakkam or Bombay was quickly levered to test marine nuclear propulsion test beds before INS Arihant was built starting 2009.
Even assuming America manages to make an additional sub-building line dedicated for the RAN (unlikely, but I assume that happens), I am afraid actual issues with technology transfer, project lifecycle costs are going to be considerable.
It seems to me that Australia might likely need a portfolio consisting of special mission midget subs, 8-10 conventional boats, multiple UUVs and 6-8 n-powered fast attacks (incl.2-3 support DSRVs) to truly address a scenario that the PLA-N is likely to precipitate outside the first island chain in the future. Not to mention a civilian nuclear industry as well for dual scale merits and for the dual advantage of climate change mitigation that civilian nuclear power can provide through baseload electricity.
PS: While I am sure the Kockums Collins are capable boats, I find it hard to ignore lengthy teething troubles and associated costs the RAN had to suffer for over a decade.
https://thediplomat.com/2019/02/australias-collins-class-submarines-enter-a-20th-year-of-trouble/
Thank you for your reflections on the topic. The Indian experience is instructive – noting that country is the only one ever able to lease nuclear submarines, which it did from the USSR/Russia with mixed results. I think that the debate on nuclear v conventional propulsion is not yet settled. It partly depends on the tasks to be carried out: if you want to obliterate a continent you would get an Ohio SSBN; if you want to sink a South Korean corvette close to your border then a 300 tonne mini submarine works well. There might be good reasons for Australia conducting extended patrols in the South China Sea, but if there is an explanation as to why we are prepared to spend $100 billion or whatever to do so I haven’t seen it. We also need to consider the timescale for the acquisition of nuclear submarines, with most experts saying that it will take more than 20 years.
As for the pitchfork brigade who believe that supporters of conventional submarines are traitors who should be burned at the stake, the list of people who need to die is quite long. It includes – but is not limited to – at least 4 former prime ministers (Rudd; Abbott; Turnbull and Keating) – the entire Attack class project office; the senior ranks of the RAN; significant chunks of the DoD; and quite a bit of industry, such as all of the former staff of Naval Group Australia and their French counterparts. Some of those who are now enthusiastic boosters of nuclear propulsion are the same people who insisted before September 16 that the Attack class would constitute a regionally superior submarine force.
I love the f@ct that we are actually talking about what is the needs of those who have to man them. I spoke to an old sparing partner in the US Navy about what AUKUS may just offer Australia. His firm belief is that America would be agreeable to supply the Los Angeles class but not the Virginia Class. So I feel APDR have @ good look at what options would really suit our situation, should we see what the Los Angeles Class really offers.
The idea of the Los Angeles class has come up a few times and I imagine that the RAN is looking into the possibility. At the very least they would need their reactors refuelled, a process of indeterminate cost and schedule. The final batch – the 688i class – are very capable, though it’s worth remembering that even the youngest one is 25 years old so there might also be some hull life issues to be considered depending on the number of deep dives undertaken. They also use the BYG-1 combat system, which is common to the Collins class. On the other hand they require a crew of +140, compared with +50 for Collins.
Excellente analyse.
Very interesting and enlightening comments Sir. May I ask your opinion on how we might increase submarine based deterrence during the long 20+ year gestation required to obtain the promised nuclear boats? For example, as Kym suggests, would you welcome the building of additional Collins Class as an interim solution if these could be delivered in a reasonable time or is the capability gap outlined between conventional and nuclear too great? If the latter, what else might be done?
I do not support building more Collins class or any other type of conventional submarine, assuming nuclear powered submarines can be acquired in time to replace the existing Collins class boats.
Prime Minister Morrison’s media release on 16 September included, “Under AUKUS, the three nations will focus immediately on identifying the optimal pathway to deliver at least eight nuclear-powered submarines for Australia”. The key point in this message is, ‘at least eight’. The statement further added, “The Government’s intention is to build the nuclear-powered submarines in South Australia, maximising the use of Australian workers”. These two statements leave open the possibility of more than eight submarines being acquired, with at least eight built in Adelaide. That is, one or two nuclear powered submarines could be built in the USA or UK for Australia, in advance of the first Australian manufactured submarines.
While the UK Astute class submarines are very good, the latest model Block 5 of the American Virginia class would be the perfect submarine for Australia. Nothing would need to be altered in a Virginia boat, noting the current Collins class already have the same combat system and use the same weapons. The principal advantage of the Astute class is that the UK are currently building the last of the class on order for the Royal Navy and consequently there appears to be capacity in their manufacturing to produce one or two more for Australia, although some design changes would be necessary regarding the combat system.
Fitting one or two Australian submarines into the American Virginia class production line is problematic as their two submarine shipyards are manufacturing at near maximum capacity. The Americans have however been working to expand their submarine manufacturing capacity and might be able to accommodate one or two submarines for Australia.
As I have commented previously, the future maritime battle space is far more likely to be the western Pacific, not the North Atlantic as when the Americans assisted the Brits to transition to nuclear powered submarines. The Americans are likely to attach some urgency to Australia’s nuclear submarine force to bolster their own forces in the Indo-Pacific. That is, they are likely to help us get our first nuclear submarines as soon as possible. If Australia offered for the USA to homeport a few SSNs in WA of the type we are to acquire, it would probably be in their interest and ours and would speed up our transition from conventionals to nuclear boats.
Regardless of which class, it should be possible to have one or two newly constructed nuclear powered submarines in RAN service within a decade, followed by Australian built vessels at two yearly intervals. Australia could have up to six SSNs in service by 2040 and up to 10 by the late 2040’s.
With the Collins class to undergo planned life extension, the first Collins submarine is unlikely to be retired before 2038. Australia could have the first two nuclear submarines built overseas and operating in addition to the six Collins class submarines within a decade, a force of eight boats, increasing to ten submarines in the mid 2030’s and complete the transition to an all nuclear fleet by the late 2040’s.
Thanks Denis – that’s very clear. I’m not opposed to the concept of nuclear submarines, I just have major doubts about cost and especially schedule. As things stand, even the $50 billion (2016 dollars) for the Attack class is the purchase price for more than 200 F-35s and I wonder at what point (if ever) the Defence system starts to look at other capabilities for the same money. My preference was always a Next Generation Collins ordered when it should have been around 2012. I guess we will know the way forward when the current study phase is completed, though it seems to be doing things in the reverse order because there is a chance the study will conclude that it’s too costly or that Australia needs a civil nuclear industry or that the sale of HEU reactors to Australia will not take place because of non-proliferation concerns.
We also have the great mystery of why Defence told Malcolm Turnbull in 2018 that nuclear submarines were not needed and were impractical to acquire and operate.
I feel we have serious reservations about our Collins lasting, hull wise in fulfilling the demands of an intensive naval war. Would it not be prudent in at least involving a super competent supplier, SAAB and the ASC to at least look at producing at least 4 A26 ER submarines as a stop gap?. There is history here indeed but the ASC still does a lot of work involving the A26.
Thanks for the comprehensive reply Denis, much appreciated! You really need you’re own a blog! Of course, no need for an interim conventional solution if nuclear boats can arrive sooner. Regards
I think the replies from Mr Mole calls for the withdrawal of this article. I agree it’s misinformation and certainly not drawn from any expertise or even much thought.
I think people can make up their own minds.
No disagree. Keep the article, rebuttal and following discussions, they are great reading. Lets hope the nuclear subs actually come to fruition in the time frame mentioned by Denis. If they don’t, it might be better to have more Collins as Kym says than nothing at all…
@Kym Bergmann 13/11/2021 At 8:21 am
I would disagree with the categorization ‘with uneven results’ about the effectiveness of India leasing Russian SSNs. Allow me to explain,
In short, India’s nuclear submarine program took off thanks to the ‘show me’ method of knowledge transfer practiced by the Russians. It was overall a greatly beneficial thing.
1. Charlie class SSN lease 1988-1991: This was purely to get Indian navy personnel get used to n-sub operations. The reactor compartment and controls were always under russian operational control. No operational deployment for war was allowed. Still, this gave very valuable hands on experience to the IN personnel that proved so useful when the SSBN design stage moved into gear from 1998.
2. Nerpa Akula SSN Lease 2012-2021: This was a fully controlled operation of the Indian navy with reactor being managed by Indian personnel. Weapons wise, MTCR limited to 290 km Club-S missiles besides torpedoes were loaded. As the Arihant was being completed around 2013, this second round lease gave more invaluable experiences ‘hands on’ ensuring enough crew availability when INS Arihant was commissioned in 2016.
Besides the sub, the russian advice on marine nuclear reactor design using the VM-4 reactor and a couple more models helped India build its 83 MWth CLWR by early 2000s as a test bed in Kalpakkam near Chennai (Madras). I also heard naval folks describe how this russian operational advice also proved crucial in sonar and torpedo designs (alleged french help in acoustic designs, sonar etc. also are well known and accepted as having happened as the Scorpenes were being built in parallel). As this was happening, India also got on with advanced uranium centrifuges to make enough HEU to fuel 10 subs (4 SSBNs and 6 SSNs).
Finally Russia is also helping India extend the range of the Brahmos to 800-1000 km. There are also other things, such as the priceless Russian technical help to perfect K-4 SLBM launches. Despite the occasional price gouging, we do owe Russia a big thanks, overall.
In short, India’s submarine program would not have reached where it is today without Russian and some French help. I am 110% certain uncle sam would not have done anything remotely close in similar circumstances (setting aside the US-UK exception, we would have got ‘pious’ lectures on nuclear probity and similar pablum)
Australia will need to do something similar to build true nuclear ecosystem. Also, it needs to be acknowledged imho that there are places such as the Torres straits where nuclear submarines cannot transit safely and the RAN might be better off with a highly automated, low crew based coastal sub such as the Type-206 or may be a UUV…A large all nuclear fleet is likely neither practical nor affordable in the long run if truth be told…
Both the PLA-N and the IN are embracing tactics that afford flexibility of UUVs, midget subs, SSPs and SSNs suitably supported by surface vessels and airborne ASW, AEW assets ….
Many thanks for those additional details. My understanding was that there was dissatisfaction with the arrangements for the Charlie because it remained under the control of Russian officers rather than Indian and that was the reason for the lease ending after only 3 years. The point has also been made that the Nerpa has been returned ahead of the actual lease expiry date, though I have not been able to find a reason for that. It was only a matter of a few months, so might not be significant. One of many problems that Australia faces is that it does not look as if any nuclear submarines from either the UK or the US will be available for lease in the next decade. That could change if there were a Presidential or Prime Ministerial directive, but it is hard to see why either country would be motivated to do Australia such a big favor to their own detriment.
I agree entirely with your views about the increasing roles for UAV/UUV systems and the need for Australia to be investing in this technology. A Chinese source of moderate reliability tells me that the PLA(N) will use self-configuring swarms of small, very fast autonomous surface vessels with dipping sonar and ASW torpedoes to hunt hostile contacts in addition to more conventional methods.
You are actually right about the 1988 Charlie class lease. Partly, the limitations imposed by the then imploding USSR was also a part of the reason the sub was sent back for decommission in 1991. But, on balance, the experience gained was way more useful than any contractual limitations.
As for the Akula II INS Chakra, 2 incidents sealed its fate. One was the damage to titanium sonar dome in 2017 when the sub hit something while entering Vizag Harbour in Andhra Pradesh State. Indian specialists with Russian help were able to repair it and gain experience working with Titanium based parts.
The second was a cylinder explosion (around June 2020?) in the middle of the hull with possibly one death and extensive damage to sensitive electronic circuitry in the vicinity. This made the sub a costly asset to keep. (India is building the Rambilli INS Varsha base to overcome this limitation and build a PLA-N Hainan like sub-pen for the 4 SSBNs and later SSNs)
Additionally, the ageing reactor was also proving time consuming to maintain.
All this ensured the INS Chakra/Nerpa was returned about 6-8 months ahead of time. The Akula 2 Bratsk is now undergoing deep refit to join the Indian Navy as Chakra 3 in 2025-26.
https://twitter.com/ralee85/status/1102626116660006912
This time the INS Chakra 3/Bratsk might see testing of India’s homegrown Nirbhay LACM, precision strike missiles, extended range Brahmos firing and other things (like special missions as 2 special midget subs are also under order)
Regarding your UUV comment on the PLA-N, I think it entirely viable that they use them for ISR, mine laying or torpedo launching in a passive ambush mode (an unmanned suicide torpedo UUV if you will). This makes operational sense too. The Yuan AIP is a Stirling engine and is likely to be detectable in the mostly shallower waters of the SCS. So instead of exposing the Shang class SSNs or the Yuan SSPs, the PLA-N could go for a ‘cheap disposable volume deterrence’ in the form of UUVs.
Indian army has been testing UAV swarms along the chinese ans pakistani lines of control in Kashmir for about an year now. Something that has not gone unnoticed in pakistan
https://quwa.org/2021/01/17/india-demonstrates-drone-swarming-capability-2/
The Azerbaijini use of loitering munition UCAVs with a ton of Israeli and Turkish help has also been noted in India and as you may be aware Indio-Israeli cooperation in the sea ranges from long range SAMs to technical collaboration for underwater systems. I see no reason why AUVs/UUVs won’t be deployed in due course in the Bay of Bengal or Western Coast of India.
I find it puzzling that Australia does not seem consider the costs of a SSN fleet as part of the need to develop a much bigger ecosystem (in turn entailing substantial costs additionally). Keating’s toothpicks at a mountain comment might be construed by the LNP as titillating sleaze, but good ol’ Keating has a point here.
Presumably there will be an attempt to quantify costs for the proposed Australian SSN fleet during the current 18 month study phase. This is just one more hurdle to be overcome. The Australian economy is the world’s 12th largest – just behind Russia – and spends way less on defence than all of the other SSN operators, so affordability will be a factor.
more than the money, I think Australia might find useful lessons from India’s folly of ‘arming without aiming’ as Stephen Cohen put it pithily. Ofcourse, a 100 bil AUD annual defence budget won’t be easy on the exchequer.
The chinese are playing a very patient game of ‘go’ or ‘chess’. Indian army has faced this hydra like strategy for the past one year in Ladakh Aksai Chin. RAN, RAAF will need to arm accordingly carefully seeing what PLA-N and PLA-AF are doing in terms of offensive and defensive tactics. India has kind of cottoned on and started to do right things such as testing the DF-26 equivalent Agni-P or drone swarms or long range SAMs in destroyers (incl. the under planning type 18 13000 ton 100 VLS cruiser).
My hope is that Australia’s government does manage to arm the RAN and RAAF intelligently to counter the PLA-N and PLA-AF credibly enough to give the chinese pause before they embark on one of their time tested provocation tactics. (read the qing invasion of burma 1765-1769 and how china kept its armies and suspended relations till 1790 despite repeated losses…yes they are that pig-headed..emperor qianlong would have admired his protege xi)
Thank you for the additional information and analysis. I was not at all familiar with the four invasions of Burma 1765-1769 but they look instructive as to how larger forces can be defeated by smaller ones.