The United States has been in the forefront of unmanned aerial systems (UAS) development for many years and continues to account for a disproportionate share of the world UAS market. This is due to a variety of factors, including traditional US investment aerospace development, as well as the acceleration caused by the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. There has been a distinct downturn in UAS funding over the past few years due to the draw-down from Afghanistan and Iraq. The number of drone missions has substantially decreased, and the combat-related loss rate of small tactical drones has largely ended.
Many of the larger programs have ended their new procurement including the MQ-1C Gray Eagle, RQ-4 Global Hawk, RQ-7 Shadow, MQ-9 Reaper, and others. The only large UAV procurement programs now underway are the MQ-4C Triton and MQ-25 Stingray, and the Navy has substantially trimmed back the MQ-4C program.
There has been recognition for some time that the large, low surveillance drones such as Reaper and Global Hawk are not survivable in a high intensity conflict. This has been reaffirmed by the ongoing war in Ukraine where larger drones flying at medium altitude have been swept from the sky.
The new DoD focus is on more survivable drones. On the larger platforms, this approach will focus on more expensive stealthy aircraft. This includes the Air Force’s current Collaborative Combat Aircraft issue as well as new ISR drones that presumably exist in the classified environment.
The compositions and technical features of the current US UAV force was heavily shaped by short-term war requirement for the conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan. Systems were acquired to fulfill immediate tactical needs, even if not entirely ideal. With both Iraq and Afghanistan fading in the rear-view mirror, the services are taking a fresher look at future UAV requirements.
Both Iraq and Afghanistan represented benign air defense environments. Aircraft such as the MQ-1 Predator and MQ-9 Reaper were survivable in these environments since they did not face any medium altitude SAM threat or any hostile fighter threat. Syria was a slightly different scenario, as the Syrian armed forces up until recently possessed some modern air defenses. Russian forces in Syria had deployed modern air defenses at their bases in Syria that could have interfered with US RPA operations. The Russians claim to have shot down several UAVs over Syria, including some that were under US control.With the fall of Bashar al-Assad and the following Israel attacks the situation has changed.
The current fleet of RPAs (not considering the unknown “black” fleet) is not survivable in a high-intensity conflict with near-peer SAM and aircraft threats. In past cases where UAVs tried to operate against even a moderate air defense threat, such as NATO operations in the Balkans in the 1990s, and during the Russo-Georgian War, UAV losses were severe. Some Air Force leaders have made this point very strongly in recent years. This does not mean that the current RPA fleet is obsolete. It is still mission-capable across a wide range of scenarios. However, scenarios at the higher end of the threat spectrum are no doubt the source of considerable concern to US Air Force planners.
To address the higher threats, the Air Force would undoubtedly desire RPAs with greater survivability than existing types, such as the RQ-4 Global Hawk and MQ-9 Reaper. During the deliberations over the FY14 budget, heavy cuts were made to the RQ-4 Global Hawk program, which had enjoyed considerable support in Congress. When pressed on the matter in Congressional hearings, DoD officials indicated that the missions of the cancelled Global Hawk Blocks could be performed by the U-2 and unidentified “classified platforms”. This may include RQ-170 and RQ-180. It is by no means certain how many RQ-170s or RQ-180s were built, or if they are still in production.
The new Collaborative Combat Aircraft is part of the trend towards stealthy platforms. The Air Force has several potential CCA applications, including a fighter-sized SEAD (suppression of enemy air defense) aircraft to replace the F-117 Stealth fighter, an air-to-air fighter to supplement F-35 and NGAD, an electronic warfare jammer aircraft, and a deep penetration reconnaissance platform.
The USAF has backed away from an unmanned strategic bomber, and the B-21 Raider effort will be a manned platform at least for now. Recently, the USAF has identified the B-21 as a possible candidate for an accompanying “loyal wingman” drone, but given the cost of the B-21, this may get kicked down the road until the 2030s.
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