VIEWPOINT: RAN’s Sisyphean task for submarine ops and maintenance

The Australian government’s decision for the Royal Australian Navy and the national shipbuilding industry to support three different submarine classes to sustain and enhance Australia’s long-term strategic underwater capability is, in my view, unrealistic. The plan imposes an unworkable burden on the already limited resources of both the Australian naval defence industry and the RAN.

The programs are the life-of-type extension (LOTE) for the Collins-class submarines, crewing and maintenance support of US Navy Virginia-class SSNs, and the development in the United Kingdom and the construction in Australia of a fleet of AUKUS-class nuclear attack submarines.

The Life-Of-Type-Extension
LOTE, a ten-year-life-of-type extension of the Collins-class, is to ensure Australia maintains an undersea warfare capability until the Virginia-class attack submarines arrive from the US in 2032, and the AUKUS submarines are available in the early 2040s.

The planned service life of the Collins-class is 30 years. The first submarine, HMAS Collins, was commissioned in July 1996 and the last boat, HMAS Rankin, in March 2003. Without an upgrade the Collins-class will be progressively decommissioned over the next eight years, with HMAS Rankin to be retired in 2033.

Platform ageing, material fatigue, corrosion, spare parts availability, and technical changes increasingly affect operational reliability and performance, making extending the service life of the class possible only with significant technical, costly and time-consuming refurbishment.

A successful LOTE implemented across the class could potentially have the Collins- class remain in service until 2043. However, given the extent of the currently specified design changes, LOTE will be high-risk, expensive, and unlikely to be realisable on all boats.

A LOTE upgrade to the propulsion system, new diesel engines and generators, power conversion and cooling systems as well as extensive other planned and unplanned work during a deep maintenance program, require a comprehensive redesign of the class. Modifications to the submarines’ pressure hull, including the diesel and engine foundations, fuel and trim systems, require new stability and buoyancy calculations, submarine trials and recommissioning periods.

Latent conditions particularly prevalent on ageing platforms will determine the program completion time as will force majeure events such as delayed sub-vendor deliveries, labour and engineering shortages or industrial relations. The currently scheduled two-year completion period for this scope of work is simply illusory.

The RAN and ASC now appear to have recognized this dilemma and are launching the plan of a “LOTE-Lite” option, without explaining what this entails. It may include not cutting the stern section for replacing major systems but instead continue with support and cyclic maintenance until decommissioning. The expectation of reducing shipyard time when the hull remains in one section may be a fallacy; reduced access for maintenance and repair on an ageing submarine is considerably more difficult.

The perpetual RAN submarine crewing dilemma
Since commissioning in 1996, the RAN has not come close to meeting the crewing requirements for its squadron of six Collins submarines. This crew shortage will escalate into an intractable problem for the RAN if the US President approves the delivery of Virginia-class submarines to Australia in early 2032. Crewing and supporting three submarines of this class equates to twice the numbers required for the six Collins submarines. It will be an enormous challenge to meet the operational tempo of a three-class submarine squadron.

Submariner training is lengthy and demanding. In the RAN, only the most outstanding naval officers passed the submariner command course (SMCC). Known to be the toughest leadership program in the Navy – comprising theoretical, on-land simulations and 60 days unrelenting submarine warfare exercises at sea, it became known as Perisher because the failure rate is so high with no opportunity of appeal.

To command a U.S. Navy nuclear attack submarine (SSN) is even more demanding. Under AUKUS a select group of Collins-class warfare officers have already had the opportunity to undertake training and serve on Virginia-class SSNs. To qualify, the officers must attend the Navy Nuclear Propulsion (Power) School at the Charleston -Naval Weapons Station in South Carolina, take the Submarine Officer Basic Course, and finally deploy aboard a U.S. submarine to successfully complete the course.

The USN nuclear school is the most demanding academic program in the U.S. military. Students must proceed rapidly through the course with high academic standards enforced in all subjects. Officers would mostly enter the school with a university degree in nuclear engineering or other academic qualifications since the high intensity nuclear course is cramming the degree into 6 months.

According to recent accounts approximately 100 RAN officers and enlisted sailors are in the U.S. Navy submarine training pipeline with a handful assigned to U.S. Virginia-class SSNs. If the traditional British Australian ‘Perisher’ officer program is required for the AUKUS-SSNs, the nuclear submarine training program must also be completed for this class.

Separately, in preparation for getting Australian industries and emergency services ‘nuclear ready’ when USN attack submarines are based in Australia some 40 personnel from ASC are apprenticed to the Pearl Harbor Naval Shipyard and Intermediate Maintenance Facility in Hawaii for supporting USN boats in Australia and in preparation for their roles to maintain future RAN nuclear-powered submarines.

Risks of achieving a long-term strategic underwater capability in 20 years
Under the AUKUS agreement between Canberra, London, and Washington, three Virginia-class submarines are planned for delivery after 2032, with an option for two more. However, the U.S. Navy’s submarine construction programs are under pressure in meeting its own needs. Production bottlenecks, supply chain problems, cost increases, and budget constraints are slowing down the scheduled delivery times for the Virginia and the Columbia SSBN programs. This could prevent or significantly delay the Australian procurement of USN submarines.

With the cancellation of the contract for twelve diesel submarines from the French NAVAL Group in favour of eight UK nuclear-powered attack boats, Australia’s future submarine capability is in the lap of the gods. The decision to go with a French-designed, Australian-built diesel-electric submarine was already a risky proposition.

Under the AUKUS agreement, the delivery of Virginia-class attack submarines to Australia in the early 2030s remains uncertain until the RAN has demonstrated its ability to crew, safely operate, and maintain nuclear-powered submarines, and, importantly, is subject to the President of the United States ratifying this sale of SSNs to Australia.

A further risk is the decision for ASC and BAE Systems to design in the UK and build in Australia the AUKUS SSN class to the current schedule. The complexity of that task imposes risk that may lead to irreversible negative impact on RAN submarine capabilities.

A missed opportunity
Cancelling the contract with NAVAL Group in 2021 for twelve diesel ATTACK-class submarines led to the decision by the government to acquire three US Virginia-class SSNs, design and build five AUKUS-class SSNs, and prioritise a life-extension of the Collins-class.

The decision to favour nuclear over diesel-electric propulsion provided the opportunity to switch from the Shortfin Barracuda to the SSN Barracuda design. It was the reference design for the SSN Suffren of the French submarine fleet, as well as the Australian diesel-electric ATTACK-class.

At 5,300 tons submerged and with a crew of 60, it is comparable in size and displacement to the original Australian requirements. Although smaller than the 7,900-ton Virginia-class and with a lower weapons payload—without vertical missile launchers—the Suffren-class is a flexible, general-purpose design. As demonstrated by the commissioning of the first submarine of this class in 2020, the Suffren-class is more economical to build, operate, and maintain than the attack submarines of the USN and RN.

Due to their smaller displacement, the class is better suited for operations in the Coral Sea northeast of Australia, as it would be in the littoral waters of the South China Sea than the USN and RN boats. The Suffren boats’ reactors use low-enriched uranium, which is refuelled every ten years. The highly enriched reactors of the RN and USN boats have a planned lifetime of 30 years but with that class also undergoing comprehensive maintenance periods (PMPS) during planned dockings and augmentations.

The French Suffren-class should have been the logical choice for the RAN in 2020/21. Today NAVAL Group’s submarine design and shipyard capacities are overstretched with the delivery of the SSN Suffren and the Next Gen SSBN classes for the French Navy, as well as the four SSK Orka-class submarines for the Royal Netherlands Navy.

The Australia submarine builder ASC has no experience, no capacity and therefore no ability to support the design and the building of nuclear submarines.

It would have been sensible for SAAB-Kockums of Sweden to be considered earlier in the piece for an advanced Collins-class design. Kockums (KAB) designed the T-471, and, in partnership with ASC, built the Collins boats based on this design in Australia.

It would have been more cost-effective and practicable to renew this partnership for at least four next-generation T-471 submarines for the RAN. It would have provided a safety net should the Collins LOTE program run into difficulty, the SSN AUKUS program suffer lengthy delays or massive cost-blowouts, the US government withdraws or delays the sale to Australia of Virginia-class submarines.

The Predicament
Five SSN-AUKUS boats, based on a UK design, are scheduled for delivery to the RAN from the early 2040s.The British submarine industry has a poor record of timely program deliveries. They are stressed to meet their domestic support, maintenance, and new-build requirements, all of which will impact on the AUKUS program.

The engineering skills required for Collins, Virginia, and AUKUS are considerable. Each program is subject to its own design philosophies, standards, regulatory requirements, supply chains, infrastructure, documentation, and training schedules. These requirements would pose challenges to even the most experienced submarine builder.

Can the RAN, the ASC, and the Australian defense industry support these programs? This requires a fundamental rethink in Canberra. With the current attitude, Australia will not have a sovereign submarine capability in the foreseeable future.

(Note: Hans J. Ohff is a Visiting Fellow at the University of Adelaide, CEO and Managing Director of ASC during the Collins construction and delivery program from 1993 to 2003.)

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