An internal Defence report tabled in the Senate has identified a number of pilot mistakes and inadequate training as major contributors to the highly publicised ditching of a twin-engine Taipan helicopter, codenamed Bushman 82, last year. The accident occurred over water near Nowra during a training exercise on 22 March 2023, with no loss of life – but it was a close-run thing.
Defence Minister Richard Marles has chosen to release only the redacted Executive Summary, writing in the covering letter:
“Defence has advised me that there is a significant risk that release of the full report and associated documents at this time may influence the willingness of personnel to participate in other investigations, which may impede ongoing investigations into the incident off Lindeman Island on 28 July 2023 by Defence, the Inspector-General of the Australian Defence Force, and other authorities. Defence further advises me that, were this to occur, it would represent a significant legal risk to the Commonwealth.”
Investigations into flying accidents usually reveal a complex set of circumstances, and this is no exception. The root cause of the accident was the rupture of a high-pressure turbine blade in the left-hand side Number 1 engine, which caused a catastrophic but contained failure. This particular problem has never occurred previously and in fact the engines – and the entire family of NH90 helicopters, of which Taipans are a part – are exceptionally safe.
However, in the aftermath of the incident, Army implied that everything was due to this single technical issue. Consequently, this has been fed to the media – and through them a false narrative has been conveyed to the Australian public that Taipans are unsafe and had to go. The truth is far more complicated than that – and has profound implications for the ongoing inquiry in the fatal Lindeman Island crash, which claimed the lives of four service personnel.
In an emergency, Taipans are designed to fly on a single engine – the Safran RTM-322 – which is one of the most safe and reliable in its class. However, as bad luck would have it the helicopter was at very low altitude and was heavily loaded at the time with Special Forces divers. Because it takes a fraction of a second for the computerised engine control system to respond to a failure, the helicopter dropped while moving slightly forward and briefly touched the sea surface before rising to a low hover.
So far, so good – the helicopter responded as it should – but an already scary situation was made worse because four Special Forces divers were hanging onto the outside of Bushman 82 as part of the exercise. From here on, the situation gets even messier, with the report stating that aircrew in the back of the helicopter were able to release the two SF divers on the left-hand side – who dropped safely into Jervis Bay – but the two on the right-hand side were dragged unexpectedly through the water, being stripped of their equipment in the process.
The crucial part of the report then explains:
“Bushman 82’s aircrew did not recognise the aircraft briefly impacted with water while executing initial bold-face emergency procedures. With the Automatic Flight Control System ‘Hover Mode’ still engaged and the right-hand engine at maximum power, the aircraft then rose into a low hover of approximately 23 feet albeit with rotor speed decaying.
“The Non-Flying Pilot in the left-hand cockpit seat, believing the aircraft had settled on the water, removed their helmet in preparation for commencing emergency egress procedures. The Flying Pilot in the right-hand cockpit seat, now aware the aircraft was in fact in a low hover, shut down the right-hand engine at a height of approximately 19 feet. This resulted in a high rate of descent, an impact force of 80, extensive structural damage to the airframe and automatic activation of the EFS (Emergency Floatation System.”
An earlier part of the report states and is worth repeating:
“As a result of the Flying Pilot’s actions to shut down the Number 2 (right-hand) engine at a height of approximately 20 feet, the aircraft descended rapidly and impacted the water a second time at a force of 8G. The crew egressed successfully with minor injuries and were retrieved by prepositioned emergency rescue vessels.”
This has been the consistent reporting of APDR – the helicopter performed as designed, but the situation could have involved serious loss of life because of human operator error. Hitting the water at 8Gs is no joke and one shudders to think what would have happened to all on board if they had been on another type of aircraft.
The report also says that the Army had decided for reasons of cost not to implement a fix for the RTM-322 engine turbine blades that had been recommended years before by the manufacturer.
In dry language, the report details the confusion in the cockpit about the altitude of the Taipan – and because of this misperception first one pilot and then the second, removed all connections to their Top Owl day/night helmet so they could get out as quickly as possible. This was motivated by an unjustified fear that the helicopter – which is fitted with safety flotation devices – would quickly roll over and sink.
This misperception might have been caused because that is what would have happened if a helicopter without floatation devices – such as a Black Hawk or a Sea Hawk – had been forced to ditch in similar circumstances.
The report continues:
“The Non-Flying Pilot’s decision to remove their helmet contributed to the lack of effective crew coordination and communication to complete emergency checklist procedures to ditch the aircraft and prepare for the crew’s egress. In particular, selection and operation of switches by the pilots for critical systems, such as aircraft engines, requires the pilots to communicate to identify the selection and confirmation of the correct operating system. Therefore, when the Non-Flying Pilot removed their helmet, they were less likely to be able to prevent the Flying Pilot’s inadvertent or inappropriate selection of the right-hand engine STOP-IDLE-FLIGHT switch to STOP.
“The Flying Pilot’s decision to shut down the right-hand engine was not in accordance with standard emergency procedures. This decision was found to be heavily influenced by their concern over potential injuries to the crew and personnel in the vicinity caused by flying debris from high-energy rotors striking the water. The Flying Pilot’s awareness and level of concern was formed after witnessing injuries to personnel in similar circumstances during a rotary-wing accident while serving on an overseas exchange posting.”
To stress the point that APDR has repeatedly made, the Taipans are a very safe platform and have a better record than any other contemporary helicopter. Because the Nowra ditching occurred four months prior to the Lindeman Island fatality, much of the incorrect commentary – encouraged by Army – has allowed an impression to build up that the helicopters were unsafe.
Nothing could be further from the truth – and the real culprit looks to be Army and their processes, particularly training. The end result of this unfortunate chain of events is the completely unnecessary scrapping of the entire Taipan fleet. The exact causes of the Lindeman Island tragedy await the outcome of a separate inquiry, expected to be finalised by the end of this year.
It is also worth noting that this report was finalised a year ago.
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You really are under the payment of Airbus aren’t you.
“The aircraft performed as designed” – it blew an engine. Just like it did around ten years ago in Adelaide… “one of the safest”? Never year heard of a helo engine blowing in any of the Black Hawks we had, the Chinooks we have, the Black Hawks we’ve got, the Kiowas we had… yet two in 12 years?
You need to stop with the pathetically biased reporting Kym. Go join the military and become a helicopter pilot before you start putting out this BS. Especially with the “better record than than any contemporary helicopter…” Oh please! It’s got the worst record in recent years! That’s why so many nations are handing them back or cancelling orders. That’s a fact Kym, and I am not being paid by anyone through endorsements or similar to make this stuff up.
Interesting that you are posting anonymously. I repeat the statement that the NH90 family has an excellent safety record. Apart from Australia – which has destroyed its fleet and buried the remains – of the approximately 520 NH90s delivered, how many have been “handed back?”
I’m not under the pay of anyone and I’ll keep reporting on this absolute fiasco as more information comes to light.
Liberal socialist , To my understanding , the only 3 Countries have cancelled their NH90 acquisitions, none of them for performance or Safety reasons. The NH90s that have been returned are all variants that required integration of foreign equipment or software. The findings of the Internal Report were not made by APDR but by the Army, its findings show Pilot error and lack of maintenance were the primary causes of the incident. It’s telling that the statement from Marles contained If disclosure of the un redacted report made public “It would represent a serious legal Risk to the Commonwealth “ the Facts are The engine failure was due to poor or lack of maintenance (due to costs) Pilot error due to inadequate training. In a nut shell, the Army Aviation Regiment didn’t have enough money to look after its equipment, ( something that has always been the case) I don’t believe in some of the theories that Mr Bergmann has written about ( not without any serious proof ) but attacking MrBergmann’s and his credibility will not change the basic facts.
Thanks Michael. I find that all of the anonymous critics of Taipan are unable to answer basic questions such as why New Zealand has been operating their NH90 fleet without major difficulties – and have just completed a significant comms upgrade.
Note that all these statements (issues related to maintenance management [aggravated by the different grounding] ; issues related to training, including training on the Night Vision system) were pointed by some, following the crash…
The report literally states:
“ The investigators found that in 2017, following “several” engine failures in Taipans across the world, the manufacturer had recommended the engine blades be replaced with modified blades”
Yet you continue with your Airbus sponsored nonsense. You should be barred from journalistic enterprise. Sell out
Interesting comment from someone else with a made up name. Why are people not prepared to identify themselves? Isn’t that the entire point – modifications were recommended by the OEM that Army never implemented.
I have absolutely no idea what you mean.
“the manufacturer had recommended the engine blades be replaced with modified blades”
Yes that is correct and yet the ADF never carried out the replacement.
Airbus identified a problem, Airbus let users know how to fix it and provided the required parts.
The ADF did not carry out the required works.
All down to the ADF.
No wonder Marles is worried about legal issues.
Yes – and that probably explains why the government sat on the report for a year. There’s a lot more to come out on this story.
The programme, with continuous changes requested (while in other hand not implementing the recommended fixing)…
… The Australian Army’s ‘Black Hawk’ community, that spent more energy to lead Tapians to failure than acting with honesty…
… Add some other possible conflicts of interests (i.e: https://www.washingtonpost.com/investigations/interactive/2022/australia-nuclear-submarines-us-admirals/)
Like when authorities take the decision to stop to operate Taipans in order to accelerate the entry of BlackHawk, incl. the production (promoting re-classement of AH personnel to LM, following an arguing by LM of some difficulties to get qualified personnel)
6 years and Army still hadn’t replaced thr
e blades…How is that Airbus’s fault…
You are correct.
I wouldn’t be surprised if over the years the Blackhawk mafia within Army had been setting the platform up to fail without Govt realising until these more recent investigations shone a bit more light on reality.
However, upon realising what had been happening and that Govt had reacted to quickly to an internal recommendation to permanently grond the aircraft, Govt have decided to save face, rather than admit the premature retirement was too much.
Saying all that, it’s not to say the aircraft aren’t exorbitantly expensive to operate in comparison to others. Hasn’t that been admitted?
Also, with regards to the NZ examples, weren’t the Army expecting a higher level of output from our aircraft compared to other users? Sorry I can’t recall the source of that one…
Thanks Joshua, I agree with much of what you write – particularly Army setting up the helicopter to fail. As it happens, due to a lot of hard work, by 2018 Army and Airbus were achieving an availability rate for Taipan of around 80%, which was close to the best in the world, but then it fell away rapidly for reasons I’ll explain in a future article. Yes, it is an expensive helicopter to maintain – but that’s because it has a higher level of performance with things like a weather radar and rear ramp. I’ve tried to provide some analysis of how Army has come up with the outrageous figure of $40k per flight hour. If exactly the same methodology were used as for a Black Hawk it would probably be one third of that. Still more expensive, yes, but worth it – in my opinion.
Re: analysis of how Army came up with its outrageous figure.
The ADF calculates cost per flying hour by dividing the cost of the sustainment contract by the hours flown for that year. It doesn’t include fuel, salaries for uniformed personnel or costs for defence facilities – just the cost charged by the sustainment contractor.
18/19 was MRH90’s best year in terms of hours flown – 7246. Its sustainment contract that year was $238.5m. Therefore, in 2018-19 MRH90’s reported cost was $32900 per hour.
The 18-19 Defence annual report only lists the 30 most expensive sustainment contracts. #30, the LSD Capability Assurance Program, was $50m.
Black Hawk didn’t make it into the report, so let’s assume for the sake of argument its sustainment contract was $49m. In 18-19 Black Hawk flew 3158 hours, so using the same methodology as for MRH90, its cost per flying hour was no more than $15500.
Apples for apples, in the most flattering year for a comparison, using an elevated guess for Black Hawk costs, MRH90 cost more than twice as much per hour.
In every other year, the discrepancy was wider. For example, in 22-23, MRH90 cost about $55000 per hour because fewer hours were flown while the sustainment cost remained about the same.
Defence Annual reports and associated tables are available here: https://www.defence.gov.au/about/accessing-information/annual-reports
Many thanks for that additional detail. It’s been explained to me differently by other subject matter experts so I’ll now go back to them and see if I can reconcile the opposing views.
I’ll also add that other NH90 users have come up with far lower cost per flight hour, so something seems to be wrong with the Australian system. As we have discussed, if the entire fleet is unnecessarily grounded for an extensive period of time and the fixed costs remain the same then the cost per flying hour gets exaggerated.
You are right – the costs per flying hour become excessive if the aircraft aren’t flying. This is inevitable when the actual cost of operating the aircraft – the sustainment contract – is used rather than incidental costs like fuel and oil.
The US Army publishes two figures. A direct cost (fuel and crew wages), and a program cost (sustainment contract cost divided by hours, plus fuel costs). From memory, Chinook runs something like $6000 and $12500 an hour using the two methods.
You might remember last year the NZDF published a figure NH90 running costs of something like NZ$4000 an hour. The NZ government is spending a lot more than that to keep their aircraft flying.
You can argue with using the program cost, but defining the direct cost can be tricky. Do we include ammunition fired, countermeasures dispensed, salaries for maintainers and fuel truck drivers? What about in-flight rations? The direct cost has to be defined, and can be manipulated. The program cost is inarguable, which is why the ADF uses it.
Thanks JB – that’s helpful additional detail. I’ve asked Airbus Helicopters on numerous occasions about cost per flight hour from other NH90 users and they officially decline to answer because – get this – at a senior level they are still terrified of offending the Australian government. This is because they are making very good money selling commercial aircraft to Qantas and Virgin and absurdly think that could be hurt if they upset people in Canberra. They have slapped punitive NDAs on everyone who leaves the company and continue the media silence even to this day when catastrophic damage to their reputation has taken place.
What I can say is that other users believe their cost per flight hour is between half and one third of the Australian Army’s figure.
Dear Kym
I have read your feed with interests, I believe that the army mismanaged the taipan, aka it was a good helicopter, but wasn’t run properly in the army. Anything can be ruined by poor handling of the program. If the taipan was that bad ,why wasn’t it pulled out from service much earlier?
Based in what I am seeing from what I have read , I believe that it was going well until about 2017, and that’s when it started heading downhill.
That was roughly the time period that the taipan was been heavily modified for use by the special forces , and therefore the limited amount of money set aside for for availability was spent on capability ,but with the effect of reducing the availability rates. And then you get the knock on effects of crews unable to train on the platform. In short , they spent most resources on new equipment , rather than actually on the basic maintenance and servicing.
That might be a reasonable explanation of why the blades weren’t replaced when the manufacturer recommendation came out.
Keep in mind that the top owl was put into the taipan in 2019/2020, this was made public from the lindemann island crash enquiry, but it backs up a poorly Managed program.
Finally , it really went wrong in early 2022, when the defence department announced the retiring of the taipan, under Peter Dutton. I think that really effected moral and also the top brass just forgot about the taipan, as in “she will be right mate , it will be out of service soon”.
In saying that , I might be wrong , let me know your thoughts about what I have said.
I will admit that I originally thought the taipan was a lame duck ,until I started reading more. Hence why I think it wasn’t a bad helicopter now. Expensive maybe. But not unsafe ,and the capabilities it offered was worth the money.
I will also admit that I was planning to join the adf in some capacity, not anymore, or maybe the navy instead.
Note that this is what I was thinking , I could be wrong, if so, please correct me
Thanks Kieran – that’s a helpful contribution. I’m in the same category of being something of a Taipan doubter until I started researching the topic – and in particular speaking with other users, especially the French. They think the capability is great – along with the Germans and Italians. Yes, there have been undeniable support / reliability issues, but in my view this does not detract from the fact that the Taipan / NH90 family are leading edge helicopters. Have other users had problems? For sure some – but not all – have. Have any of them dismantled / destroyed / buried their fleets? No one, except Australia.
Hi Kieran,
the amount of effort put into the Australian Taipan Program was consistent from the day it was introduced to the day flying was suspended. And that was an intense amount of effort from everyone involved, in uniform and in industry. Sustainment expenditure increased each year (check the link I provided above if you have time), matching the gradual increase in availability, hours flown and fleet size until 2018, after which flying hours started to decrease again. But the money – and effort – spent on sustainment remained consistent till the end.
No-one forgot about Taipan and took their foot off the pedal after Dutton’s announcement – the aircraft was fielded to 6 Avn Regt for the ADF’s counter terrorism response – easily the highest readiness forces anywhere in the ADF.
Top Owl was delivered with the first aircraft in December 2007, and every pilot flew with Top Owl on every flight, day and night, from about mid-2008.
Dear Jb
Thanks for clarifying a few things, it was speculation on my behalf and not helped by the lack of information.
I should have said the updated top owl system that has been making headlines with the Lindeman island crash.
Again , thanks for clarifying a few things, sorry if any offence was caused.
Dear jb
I tried to reply briefly , I am replying to your message again.
First sorry if I caused any offence with my opinion, keep in mind that what I said was mere speculation based from what public information has been released to the public.
Second, in regards to the Top owl system, i should have specified not the original but the updated top owl.
Thirdly I do believe you information that you provided through that link, however I have decided not to read it. I’m not questioning it, but like all stuff on paper it only shows what is on paper.
My personal instincts unfortunately tell me that whatever the paperwork suggests , doesn’t add up with what I’m seeing. First the witness testimonies into the lindemann island crash. Aka fatigue and workload issues been said by both victims families , friends and certain individuals involved with the taipan program.
The second is in regards to the jervis bay one, aka why wasn’t the fault that was notified by the manufacturer in 2017 not fixed in the taipan that crashed in jervis bay?. I don’t understand how or why it wasn’t fixed.
Third is the top owl itself , and I do mean the updated one that has been in the headlines. To me , that shouldn’t have been allowed to be used. I can understand the reason for its use , to allow flying at night etc. to reduce a big workload for the pilots , especially in a high workload , high stress , highly dynamic and fatiguing environment. But any fault can , in certain circumstances lead to accidents.
I have watched and read the head of the AATES giving his statement at the enquiry , and I think he did his duty. I also watched the adf give details in front of senators Shoebridge and Fawcett. Saying that they put “mitigation measures”, in place and deemed it safe. I don’t think they were applicable with the lindemann island crash.
In short, the modified top owl should never have been used, even certified. Until the fault AATES had found was fixed.
I am also not happy with the unfair criticism given to the manufacturer which I think was unwarranted. And also would lead to more problems between weapon and system manufacturers in Australia and the adf, which is not a good thing at all.
If you read my first comment , yes I was planning to join the adf in 2022. I will no longer even consider it , the head of AATES testimony I have seen the same words said before from another program, as I know a retired RAN officer involved in the super seasprite program that was a dud.
And it has happened again, it doesn’t matter what you say, the faith is shattered.
And then you have the public perception which does have sway. It looks like the adf are doing a cover up with the lack of details , allegations of the helicopter deemed unsafe. And burying them instead of sending them to Ukraine.
It’s just hard to ignore what has been stated over the last year , and for me it was a shock.
I am not going to say anymore on the matter , but for me joining the adf, I’m just not compatable with them , after what they have done.
Thanks Keiran – that’s a very useful contribution to the discussion and I’m sure everyone is grateful for your input. The topic of what happened to Taipan raises more strong feelings than anything else I’m aware of. I have made it clear that secretly scrapping and burying the fleet – and pretending that Ukraine had not officially expressed interest in time – is the single worst decision I have ever seen Defence / Army take – and shame on the government for trying to justify what occurred.
Yes, amount of effort was since the start. But that doesn’t mean it was the right effort.
Effort was more focused on redefining the Configuration & the definition of the Taipans (like Cargo Hook) than reaching maturity of the system (including crews training, experience…)
The number of grounding (with related causes) illustrate that.
A comparison :
While Germans were claiming on the cabin floor, and missing time to mature, Finland just add plywood on the floor in order to operate the helicopter until the floor issue is fixed.
Conclusion : today, Finnish have much more experience and are much more mature on operate NH90, even is cold conditions, than Germans.
Thanks – I had no idea about the experience of Finland.
Dear Kym
Thanks to your reply of my last entry
I will leave it there,
It should be worth mentioning that I do only know of two colleagues that worked on the taipan , and that was in the RAN service. But also a few mates who have or left the adf and the army.
When the news of the top owl fault came out in early 2023, I was shocked and the only way for that to happen , was that their was a serious problem in the army to allow something so frankly stupid to happen. as stated , the updated system that was involved was tested by test pilots , found to be so dangerous that the test was cancelled early , and the army aviation ,against AATES advice went ahead ,as “it had already being paid for”.
You can do as much training as you can ,but it’s a ticking time bomb as all you need is a momentary lapse of concentration for it to be fatal , and been a helicopter pilot can be a hard and fatiguing job. Point is , this should have been fixed, and we wouldn’t been talking about it! , I also think it’s unfair to blame it on pilot error if the system was faulty, anyone under those circumstances can do the same mistake.
In regard to Richard marles, he stated that the taipan was non flyable, I think that was absolutely incorrect, and burying the taipan because it was “the best use of taxpayers money” was infuriating. But also supports a coverup.
Like I said , I will not join the adf if it does stuff like that and think that it is acceptable, but they need to look at themselves and understand why no one wants to join them. And what’s stopping them from doing this again.
I have talked to Friends and family , and they all believe that what the adf has done is despicable and unacceptable, even ex adf members. And that they are covering up. It might not be right ,but it’s the public perception, that matters.
It takes the ADF years to do anything – yet the entire Taipan fleet was irreversibly ripped apart in less than two months from late October 2023 to mid-December, at which point Ukraine was told that it was too late for them to receive even a single helicopter. This insane rush to destroy 45 perfectly good helicopters says it all. Other countries have had availability issues with NH90s – but no one else has destroyed 45 perfectly good helicopters in the space of a few weeks and buried the remains.
Well they have also destroyed their credibility
Hi Kieran,
You have caused no offence. This is a complicated situation. Most people are trying to make sense of Taipan by extrapolation from the very few data points they have; Top Owl mods, engine mods, alleged failure to listen to industry. It’s like trying to understand a what a city is like when all you know is that there’s some rubbish on the footpath and someone’s bike got stolen.
Kym has successfully prosecuted his case in APDR for the last year or so. His narrative effectively sets the tone for other media reporting and for senators at estimates. Because of this, most Taipan stories are presented in the context of conspiracy or incompetence.
While this is emotionally satisfying, it is overly simplistic, and more wrong than right.
After 15 years of intense effort, leading the world’s fleet for 12 of those years, and after fielding this aircraft in the highest readiness unit in the ADF, while simultaneously going to sea in LHDs, after multiple short notice overseas deployments and after incorporating every mod according to the manufacturer’s recommendation, what we get is “the French seem to like their NH90s”, and “why didn’t the Army replace their HP1 turbines immediately?”
Here’s a better question for everyone. What would you recommend to government if the best outcome you could hope for was less than 70% of your target hours, in the knowledge that a comparable aircraft was available at less than half the running cost?
And if you were in government, under what circumstances would you direct the Chief of Army to persist with an aircraft that has failed to meet a single performance target while costing more than expected and demanding intense oversight after being a project of concern for a decade?
If your answer to those questions are “give it to Air Force”, or “listen to industry more” I would respectfully suggest you don’t understand either Air Force or Industry. If your answer is “try harder”, then I hope you have some additional resources available. If your answer is “just ask for less from the system while paying the same for sustainment”, then congratulations, you have identified why every other complex system in the ADF avoids this kind of scrutiny.
There’s a lot there and while I certainly kicked off the reporting – Army tried to do this in secret and I only found out in mid-December – I’m certain most of my colleagues have come to their own independent conclusions about this. In fact I was first told about this in early December but the whole idea seemed so completely idiotic that it took me another 10 days to receive confirmation from a a shocked, disbelieving second source.
JB – quick question: Have any other of the 14 or so countries operating NH90s destroyed their helicopters and tried to sell them for spare parts?
Dear jb
Ask less from the system while paying the same from the sustainment is my answer.
I think that’s why the New Zealanders are having more success with theirs.
But as I already alluded too, I would not join the adf myself. My mind is not made up.
The damage is done.
Reply to Kym’s quick question:
They haven’t been ‘destroyed’, and they haven’t ‘tried’ to sell the spare parts. They have been disassembled, and the spare parts have been sold to eager buyers, because many of those spare parts are not readily available.
The disposal of these aircraft has been done in the most cost-effective way achievable. Not in the most perfect way imaginable, but in a way that will minimise the cost to the Commonwealth. This seems eminently reasonable to me because the entire reason for disposing of the aircraft was on the grounds of high cost for low output.
Are you sure about that? I thought the spares had all been sold to NHI. If they have merely been disassembled that means that they can be reassembled. However, we are told that can never happen. I think destroyed is a far more honest and realistic description under the circumstances – unless you are convinced that they can be put back together again.
Reply to Kieran.
You chose the only answer that could have worked to retain Taipan in the ADF, well, the Army – Navy has already disposed of their Taipans in favour of Sea Hawks.
But what if that lower level of output isn’t enough? What if there are dozens of missions that literally depend on the availability of utility helicopters en masse, on demand?
The problem with defining your capability by what is achievable within budget is that you have now lied to government about why you needed the capability in the first place.
And if you were right to define the capability at an unachievable level, then you are also right to insist on getting that level of performance, however you can. That is why Army is buying Black Hawk.
I am sure they can be reassembled, but I haven’t been to the storage facility to have a look. Whether they could be reassembled in a reasonable timeframe, for a reasonable cost is another matter.
On January 18, Conroy said: “Well, my advice from the department is that there are none that are in flying condition. To get any up to flying condition would require a huge investment in taxpayers’ funds, time and resources to do that.”
Indeed, the damage had been done – and with unprecedented speed. Why the extraordinary rush? I’ve never seen Army move this fast in my lifetime. If that was the situation on January 18, imagine what it is now.
Also on the topic of cost – and pardon a flash of irritation here – yes, Black Hawks will be cheaper to operate, but we are paying $3 billion to be able to do that. If you were unhappy with the fuel economy of your car but were told a replacement will cost $1 million, I very much suspect you would stick with your existing uneconomical vehicle.
Even if Black Hawks are available more often they won’t necessarily be in the air more often because they lack a weather radar.
Reply to Kym’s post at 1.05pm:
Senator Conroy seems to be agreeing with what I said – it’s probably uneconomical to return them to flying.
Re: $3 billion for Black Hawks. This should be understood in the context of the projected cost of the MRH90 Capability Assurance Program. If there was a major service due for my unaffordable car that was roughly the same cost as buying an affordable car, well, I would switch to the affordable car.
The UH-60M contract includes weather radar and FLIR. They will be fitted before declaring FOC for the SF capability.
My information about the CAP is that it included a made up number by CASG for a mythical midlife upgrade to make Taipan look unaffordable, which obviously succeeded. I also have it on good authority that neither the weather radar nor FLIR will ever be fitted to UH-60M because of an IP issue between Sikorsky and the US Army – I’m investigating this further and if you have any information I will be very grateful for that. I might be wrong, but it’s from a very well informed source inside Defence.
I’m going on a conversation when asserting that Wx radar and FLIR will be fitted. If it’s unachievable, that would be a shame.
But CAP was programmed and costed, with industry input, from 2015 at the latest. It wasn’t a made up figure and it was planned and budgeted for completely independent of the subsequent decision to divest. That it is no longer required is convenient for defence when discussing relative costs, but your characterisation of CAP as some sort of accounting trick is completely false.
I’m sure most of the CAP was indeed legitimate – just not the very large amount for an entirely fictitious MLU.
Dead Jb
Ok first thing , I am going to cut off my own participation in the discussion, as I have got a life to live, and no longer reply to any more messages , I am not ignoring what you and others said ,it’s just that we have to live.
Second, what you said doesn’t address the two main key points , first been the updated top owl software. And the second the turbine blades.
Thirdly ,yes I am fully aware of the RAN taipans for the Adelaide class LHD, I am also aware that there was an attempt to get the tender to replace old Seahawks which failed. Yes the naval experience might have had an impact on the decision making on the Taipan, yes the navy had valid reasons for decommissioning them earlier than planned.
Fourth, when the taipan was first selected as the new helicopter back in 2004, I am aware that it was against the newer Blackhawk , which we are replacing the taipans with now. I will admit that back then, buying an updated version of the Blackhawk made more sense than a newer European helicopter, as you have crews, both pilots and ground crews who were already well experienced with the older version, and even if it has cost more , you would get your money back with running cost etc. however one requirement, was to have it locally manufactured, which itself isn’t a bad idea, in fact honestly ,a sound idea.
Finally , I know people who worked on gov stuff and projects and also I have got a background in whs through my employment , and I also know a few guys who had served In the adf in some capacity.
One guy I spoke to was an army signals officer , and he said this one liner that sticks in my head “you get what you get and don’t be upset”.
So in relation to your earlier question and answer, my answer made sense to me logically ,based from what I know and do.
Because I don’t have that mindset.
It should be worth mentioning that yes the adf does some things differently than private companies ,aka show of force ,defending etc. and is not a profit organisation. But is also a government organisation that should have lead by example. Where was it?
As mentioned. I am not replying back anymore
With respect Kym, it wasn’t within weeks, and they haven’t been buried. Largely thanks to your advocacy, they probably won’t be.
But I wonder where they will be stored, and for how long? I expect the cost for the facility will be taken from the wider estate budget. But forever is a long time. When can defence actually dispose of these airframes without a series of angry articles in APDR? 2050? 2090?
Thanks. From memory, their destruction – or irreversible disassembly, if you prefer – commenced around October 15 last year. By the time the official Ukrainian request was received on December 15 they were told by Minister Conroy and others that the condition of the Taipans was such that they could never be flown again. That’s 8 weeks. An earlier call from Sen David Fawcwett to the office of Richard Marles on October 10 confirming the interest of Ukraine in the helicopters has been mysteriously swept under the carpet.
Regarding the budget, 2022-2023 had provision for their long term storage at Townsville. This plan was also mysteriously dropped.
As for their disposal, on the information available someone in Army phoned someone in NHI and asked if any other countries were interested in the Taipans and the answer we are told was no. This is an extraordinarily amateurish way to do anything. Exploring an opportunity of this size needs to be done professionally and it would take many months – if not longer – to prepare a package for sale and test the market. It also ignores the very obvious interest of Ukraine.
Yes, I’ve heard the “we did them a favor” line – but surely it’s up to Ukraine and not Australia to be making decisions about what they need and what they can support. They have a far better understanding of the situation than folks sitting in Canberra, most of whom couldn’t find Kharkiv on a map.
I’m sure there was more than one phone call to CASG’s well established contacts in NHI established over 15 years of formal and informal interactions, underpinned by membership in NAHEMA at the cost of hundreds of thousands of dollars a year.
But you neglected to mention that the decision to dispose of the aircraft was made in 2021 and 2022. Discussions about disposal and potential buyers in the wider community had been happening for well over a year by the time that apocryphal phone call was made.
There seems to be a pattern developing. The Taipans are no good and un airworthy , it’s Airbus to blame. The Arafura are no good and unseaworthy , it’s Luerssen’s fault. It’s a wonder any manufacturer would want to deal with the DoD .
Correct. But this is not a new pattern. Defence contractually blocks companies as a matter of course from speaking with the media on sensitive projects and then blames them for all problems.
With respect Kym, no one in defence or government is blaming Airbus.
Just one thing , there is a airbus promotional video series on YouTube about the taipan ,what is the story behind that.
Army was trying hard to improve confidence in the aircraft as it was being fielded into 6 Avn Regt.
It may be hard to conceptualise, but at the same time as the wider organisation was forming the opinion that Taipan might not be able to deliver what was required, the Army was doing everything it could to make it work.
There’s no link to answer your final post, so;
The decision to release the Top Owl symbology mod into service was sound. The improvements were desirable, and the issues mentioned in the test report could be, and were, mitigated by training and procedures. There is nothing, except for cynical attention seeking from a couple of senators, to implicate the Top Owl mod in the Lindeman Island crash.
Second, the Army followed OEM advice to the letter. The HP1 replacement was being conducted during deeper maintenance, rather than immediately, which would have required a fleet grounding. OEM advice was “should”, not “must”.
Thanks for the conversation, all the best.
Thanks JB – I agree completely regarding Top Owl, and I’ve done my best to look into this after it was raised by both Senators Shoebridge and Fawcett. My recollection is that on the very rare occasions when information was incorrectly displayed it was for a short time and the orientation was only out by a couple of degrees, which the experts tell me is not enough to make any difference to the dynamics of the helicopter and certainly not nearly enough to cause a crash. Your characterisation of the Senators as grandstanding is unkind. I know both of them and they have a deep interest in getting to the truth – a characteristic not shared by all Defence witnesses appearing at Senate Estimates.
I’m slightly less sure about your point regarding the HP 1 replacement. My understanding is that a number of other users have done so. I’m unclear why it was a low priority for Australia when others came to a different conclusion.
And I should add that I am far less clear on the motivation of Senator Malcolm Roberts.
I would be cautious about that , because senator David Fawcett was himself an army test pilot.
Just saying
Correct. He’s exceptionally experienced – and a very decent human being. Mainly flew Tiger but he also has a thorough understanding of Taipan and Black Hawk. Why the government ignored his advice on October 10 2023 that Ukraine was interested in the Taipans based on his discussions at a NATO meeting (he phoned in from Copenhagen as a matter of urgency) is beyond me. This is another area that I’m investigating further and I suspect there’s a lot more dirt to come out.
Dear jB
I did mention that I would be sitting out this one, and after this , I’ll give it a rest for good.
I should mention that I was involved in my industry ,which is building and construction, in safety , and got under my belt certificate four in whs, with 15 years experience under my belt, seven of which as a HSR .I know how to recognise when organisations have issues, through bitter experience.
second is that I know people involved in aviation safety and I have learnt from a lot of what they had to say.
The point in regards to the top owl, if I was going to describe it in a way to make more sense , and you have used analogies before, it would Be like not fixing reverse senses in your car. And I know that feeling because it happened to me recently.
Yes you might have no issue if you are aware of it, you can get away with it, however there might be a day where you have a really tight spot to get out of , you might be distracted or completely forget about it , you might have someone else drive it and didn’t know they worked.
The point I am trying to make , is that there will always be the exceptional circumstance not imagined, and we are not talking about simple reverse sensors , we are talking about a vital component that allows the pilots fly in bad conditions where there is very little outside visual features.
Now I will think the top owl is a great thing to have, however ,from my personal perspective. Any fault no matter how minor should have been fixed as in the system would be made fit for purpose. Because mitigation measures I know involve training , and other management systems like fatigue management etc. I am very well versed in the hierarchy of control.
I am fully aware that the army has to work in a high risk, high fatigue and high stress environment. Aka people shooting at you. However , From my perspective, that means the system should be foolproof, as in easy to understand and not be misconstrued easily.
Yes I am aware that people that run these programs, who make these choices are not idiots, you don’t allow first timers to fly really complicated machinery, they wouldn’t have been allowed to join the army in the first place.
They have to be trained and qualified, and you also have the usual checks. But sometimes people can get unlucky.
you have to keep in mind the circumstances the night of the Lindemann island crash. It was raining and pitch black , the crews and people had already complained to loved ones about fatigue and no one cared. and they were flying low and at high speed. It’s a unforgivable environment.
Now you did ask earlier about what I would do in certain situations, honestly I would have got the Top owl in question rectified ,as recommended by the aates. No questions asked. And I would have resigned if that didn’t happen. I have done that in the past before. For me the idea that ,my advice would be ignored , “as it has already been for”. From where I am standing , that is stupid. You are asking for trouble.
That’s why I am no longer interested at all, in joining the adf, because that is unacceptable. That and what I said about seeing this before in the super seasprite program. They have done it again haven’t learnt a thing. And I think that they haven’t learnt a thing or ,even worse learned the wrong lessons from this!, and I am really disappointed in the adf for that, and not just a taxpayer , one who loves reading about military history and military matters. This was not a good example.
Say all you can want ,and yes there are nice people who are doing there job , but like any bad kid who causes trouble in a classroom, they and this really stand out more.
now you can say all you want ,and your opinion may be right or wrong. I could be right or wrong. There is a lot information around this helicopter and a lot of stuff we do not know. And yes some misleading ones.
But it all Can be put out to rest , if the government realised all details to the public about what happened.
And with that , have a good weekend
I’m not sure of your point. Do you think they should have taken it down now that the Taipans have been scrapped?
Re the comments on Finland.
The Finns actually approached our Military Attache at the High Commission in the UK and made an as is /where is offer to take the Taipans.
The Finns apparently know how to get the best out of the units and saw an opportunity to add to their fleet and to get hold of more spares.
The offer was passed on to Defence but it went nowhere.
The question is why.
Why bury something you have a perfectly good cash offer for unless you have something to hide?
Thanks Alan – that’s extremely interesting. Do you have some more information or a link? I would definitely like to research this further.
It was reported in Defence Connect and there was a confirmation, of sorts, from the Finns.
It was apparently the Finnish Defence Attache in London who made the approach to our High Commission in London. That’s probably why the Swedish based Attache was not involved.
The article quoted a translation from a Finnish Defence Magazine.
It stating that their defence Attaché in London approached the High Commission staff re the acquisition of 12 ADF aircraft.
The response being that the aircraft were not to be sold?
The article further stated that Finland’s civil aviation maintain, Patria, which has a world wide reputation had stated that there would be no problem to totally refurbish the aircraft and bring up to the same standard as their current thoroughly updated force.
The article also stated feelers were made for the purchase of spare parts holding and ancillary equipment, again a no go.
Thank you Alan – I will do my best to follow up. I can understand why the request would have gone via the London High Commission because that is the ADF/Defence/CASG HQ for Europe. The records have probably been shredded – along with evidence of related matters such as Senator Fawcett’s October 10 phone call to the office of Richard Marles saying Ukraine wanted some or all of the Taipans.
Hi Alan,
it wasn’t reported – it was a comment from a person grinding his axe in a stream of uninformed and inaccurate statements about the Australian MRH90 program. Perhaps there was a request, perhaps not.
But If I was to say in this comment section, with a similar level of evidence, that that never happened, would you believe me?
Or if, for example, I said one of my friends who I served with in Afghanistan told me there was an Estonian paper reporting a conversation between an unnamed Estonian representative and an Australian trade envoy in Ankara about Estonian interest in buying Australian F/A-18As, would you believe me?
I think there’s a further credibility test that needs to be involved. Is it credible that Estonia with 1.2 million people and no air force would express an interest in acquiring F-18s? No, it is not. Is it credible that Finland, an NH-90 user and with a competent aerospace industry, would express interest in acquiring Taipans? Yes, it is.
Further to that, in December when I first sounded out people about reports reaching me that Army was in the process of destroying their entire fleet of Taipan helicopters people laughed and said they had never heard anything so completely ridiculous.
Just goes to show that truth can indeed sometimes be stranger than fiction.
Clearly I was being facetious in my previous post.
Let’s assume the conversation reported in the newspaper article described by a friend of the guy making a comment on the website referenced by Alan did happen. In the absence of an approach from the Finnish government to the Australian government or to NHI, all we have here is a fourth-hand anecdote about a meeting between two people in London.
But in any case, if the Finns were genuinely interested in expanding their fleet of NH90s, wouldn’t they be more interested in aircraft from the Nordic program to match their current fleet?
https://breakingdefense.com/2022/11/sweden-follows-norwegian-lead-and-axes-nh90-helicopter-fleet/
The whole story is, well, weird.
Indeed it’s weird. I have no idea. I can only repeat that their are many aspects of this that are strange.
Big news if true, but why didn’t they just call the Australian Defence Attaché in Sweden, who is accredited in Finland?
Or call any one of the half dozen or so program managers in Australia with whom they had shared multiple visits in Australia and Finland, and who were in contact at least twice a year, and with whom they were on a first name basis?
Weird.
In my limited experience, Australian Defence Attachés are a very mixed bunch. Maybe they did contact him / her but discovered they were far too busy on the golf course to pay the slightest bit of attention to anything remotely requiring work. The issue is definitely worth exploring further.
“But in any case, if the Finns were genuinely interested in expanding their fleet of NH90s, wouldn’t they be more interested in aircraft from the Nordic program to match their current fleet?”
Definitely not.
1. Norwegian NH-90 are NFH, not TTH.
2. Swedish NH-90 are high-cabin, which implies some specifics parts, and by-the-way some kind of “sub-fleet” (sub-version) \ “micro-fleet” management.
3. Regarding Sweden, they still not have stated on their NH-90. They study different options.
4. MRH-90 shares far more common parts with Finnish NH-90 than Norwegians’ or Swedishes.
Thanks – you are absolutely correct. The Swedes insisted on a higher ceiling – it already has a lot of cabin volume – for MEDEVAC.
Good point Julien, thanks
Dear Kym
I was watching an interview with senator david Fawcett , this was in regards to the old Abrams tanks , in which at the moment , the Australian army are not planning to send to Ukraine. He was asked about the MRH 90 taipan. In which he said that most of them have been buried ,and a few are still in a hangar in Townsville.
David Fawcett also commented that the information about the Australian army performance of the taipan compared to New Zealand nh90 does not stack up.
I still think that they have something to hide , and unfortunately burying the helicopters so quickly only adds to my suspicions.
I also did some research into the selection of the taipan , and I found something interesting.
The main reason why the taipan was selected was that it could be locally manufactured, even though the older Blackhawks it was meant to replace were also built locally by de haviland Australia. That’s brings up a question, could they have built the newer Blackhawks here ?, i believe Poland build Blackhawks at the moment.
I also need to state this to JB in relation to a question you asked me. I would have gone to the basic maintenance stuff that get the availability rating up first.
Now JB I will concede that you did have a point of view with the newer Blackhawk, however you do not waste 3.56 billion dollars finding that out!. Honestly, I think the adf still has something to hide, if the helicopter was that bad , why wasn’t it terminated way earlier , like the super seasprite program. Why did it soldier on?
Thanks for the additional information. I haven’t seen the interview with Sen. Fawcett that you refer to but he did his best to get the Taipans to Ukraine. However, Army – fully supported by the government – were in such a mad rush to destroy them that after a mere 8 weeks the entire fleet were in an irrecoverable condition. Some people have said it might be possible to put some of them back together. I genuinely don’t know, but after this length of time it would seem unlikely. Army all but took an ice pick to them to make sure no one could ever fly them again.
From my very vague recollection, HdH might have assembled Black Hawks here in the late 1980s, but there was no way they were manufactured locally. All of them came straight off the production line in Stratford and the AIC would have involved tightening a few nuts and bolts, if that. In the current edition of APDR there’s a good article about local support arrangements for the UH-60M fleet. That’s all Army want people to focus on – a happy good news story. However, there’s still a lot more information coming out about Taipan. Quick question: have any of the other users destroyed their NH90 fleets?
Dear Kym
The answer is no , and unfortunately, it is frankly ,as an Australian , it’s embarrassing. There is no other way of saying that.
We can’t afford stuff like this.
The interview in question was on the project and I saw it on his YouTube channel. A very decent guy who knows what he is talking about.
in regards to your comment of the “good news” story. I agree fully with what you said, but the adf need to answer some serious questions. But also learn from this. That’s what really worries me.
Keiran – unfortunately the Army will learn absolutely nothing from the Taipan fiasco because they believe they have done nothing wrong and they are above criticism.
Dear Kym
I agree, and I won’t be a part of it, I actually withdrawn my adf application last week ,specifically because of stuff like this. It’s just frankly unacceptable. No other way of saying that.
I would be concerned about the whole adf ,because the super seasprite program was a Royal Australian navy one.