There has been more news about AUKUS Pillar One and the developing story that Australia will no longer receive two second hand and one new Virginia class submarine from the US – as had been previously promised. The government is all over the shop, claiming that the closure of the Strait of Hormuz somehow justifies the acquisition of SSNs. No it doesn’t – submarines are almost completely useless in the current scenario because you can’t use them for clearing minefields or shooting down swarms of drones.
Under the original deal the new submarine was to be a Block VII Virginia, delivered in 2038. Block VII is much more powerful than the second hand Block IVs. They will carry 40 Tomahawk surface attack cruise missiles, compared with 12 for a Block IV. They will also have features for protecting undersea cables and launching a variety of uncrewed systems. Put simply, a Block VII is a far more powerful, modern, deterrent than Block IV.
Any official who says Block IVs are preferred because they are cheaper to maintain – even though they cannot say how much cheaper – should be sacked. A single Block VII carries as many Tomahawks as three and a half Block IVs. (A Virginia Block VII is 115m in length, not 140m.)
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The yawning void exists in the articulation of Australia’s defence strategy. Pragmatics suggest that denial of sea/air gap remains Australia’s clearest achievable means of defence. Mr Marles’s term of ‘impactful projection’ is an fragile fever dream, and the regression to Virginia Block IV VLS capacity reveals the truth in Keating’s claim that Australian submarines in the South China Sea would be the equivalent of ‘throwing toothpicks at the mountain’.
Australia could achieve the same naval strike capability of three Virginia Block IVs with a half squadron of F-15 EX, fitted with LRASMs. Total crew at risk – 24. Cost of acquisition – around the price of a single Collins LOTE refit.
Finally, at the risk of seeming like a broken record, the Arafura is the perfect platform for the development, testing, deployment and sustainment of the Speartooth LUUV across the Arafura and Timor Seas. Give CIVMEC Henderson some work and restore the program with vessels upgraded for close in air and drone self defence, mine clearance and electronic monitoring capabilities.
Couldn’t agree more – on all your points.
Post production upgrades for Arafura include main gun, support for uav and uuv systems and possible SSM, towed array and other containerised mission modules.
They could – and should – all have been there from the beginning.
Block VII is 115m and doesn’t have the VPM(extra 25m hull extension for 4×7 cells-28 extra missiles), only Block V and VI do.
Block VII may not go ahead with a new SSN planned.
No, Block IV is 115m / 8,000 tonnes. Block VII is 140m / +10,000 tonnes. Basically, Block VII incorporates the VPM inside the hull and adds some extra capabilities.
My real point was not so much differences between Block IV and Block VII – I don’t think we will get either – but rather to point out the sheer stupidity of the government’s position, swallowing hook, line and sinker the complete nonsense they have been told by the RAN, coupled with their own inability to critically think about AUKUS.
Blocks 1-4 = 115m
Blocks 5-6 = 140m
Blocks 7 and possibly 8 = 115m
Yes, you are correct – I’ll correct in the next podcast – though still with 40 Tomahawks v 12 for Block IV, so the point remains exactly the same.
Whatever the differences between the Block are the odds are we won’t be sold anything at all
That seems the most likely result.