Australia will assume command of the Combined Maritime Force’s Combined Task Force (CTF) 153 from October. The six-month appointment demonstrates Australia’s ongoing commitment to maritime security and international rules and norms. CTF 153 was established in April 2022 and focuses on international maritime security and capacity-building efforts in the Red Sea, Bab al-Mandeb, and Gulf of Aden.
Australia has been conducting maritime security operations in the Middle East under Operation MANITOU since 1990 and has previously commanded CTFs 150 and 152. This will be the first time Australia has commanded CTF 153. Assuming the leadership of CTF 153 will see Australia maintain its current contribution to the CMF, which was bolstered in December 2023 in response to Houthi attacks on shipping and maritime traffic in the Red Sea. Operation Manitou and Australia’s command of CTF 153 is separate to the support Australia is providing to international efforts to target and degrade Houthi capabilities in Yemen under Operation Hydranth
Chief of Joint Operations, Vice Admiral Justin Jones, said: “Australian Defence Force command of CTF 153 is a significant milestone in our commitment to maritime safety and security. We proudly work alongside 44 other member nations in the Combined Maritime Force to support freedom of navigation and free, fair and open trade, and the international rules‑based order. This role demonstrates Australia’s commitment to international rules, and complements our separate deployment under Operation Hydranth.”
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The typical man in the street would ask “how can be Australia leading CTF 153 [1] without any Australian warships in theatre?”
The answer is CTF 153 concerns much more than warships:
Australia has much command and control responsibility over sensors on satellites, on Reaper (and larger) UAVs and manned aircraft involved in the detection of Houthi missile launches. This includes SigInt collection and destruction of Houthi and broader Iranian proxy forces in Yemen and the wider MidEast region that endanger civilian ships and warships.
Much of this Australian command and control and SigInt collection network involve satellites that work to Pine Gap staff in Australia [2] and Australians working in UK and US bases in the Middle East, closer to the action.
[1] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Combined_Task_Force_153
[2] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Pine_Gap#Military_activities
Thanks – that’s very helpful.
Not to take away from the importance of Australia leading CTF 153 but we should definitely have a rotational deployment of the Hobart class ships in the Red Sea. This is rare opportunity to operationally test the Hobart’s and their crews in a relatively low threat environment. In addition both the RN and the USN have reported that Operation Prosperity Guardian has improved retention rates amongst it’s participating sailors as they choose to sign on for additional service rather than retire.
Hi Kym been following your articles for the past 4 years .
You’re on the most part not sensationalist and ask the difficult questions .
I see you won’t let the Tipan helicopter destruction sorry slip of the tongue pulled to pieces very thoroughly .
Issue rest and I’m sure the Army dread answering the logic behind that simple question.
If we burry perfectly good million dollar helicopters ,then the conclusion can only be we don’t need helicopters in the Army.
And if the Answer is we do need them !why didn’t we wait till we had the replacements ?
So if we need them; but we burried them and all of a sudden we need to move soldiers quickly.
We can’t so while they are in denial of those actions the Defence department has spent money acquiring civil helicopters and RFS assets to keep up training.
One of many subjects to follow and cover .
Brilliant work you do keep at it like a dog with a bone .
I’m a great fan.
Thanks for the feedback. The senseless destruction of the Taipan fleet is the single worst decision I have ever seen taken by Defence. Why Marles and Conroy went along with such obvious stupidity is beyond me. Someone should have said whoa!
Kim that’s a real call as the DoD has a history of throwing away billions in helicopters but the OPVs which are now just big water taxis and I suspect will be given away to our neighbours etc etc etc
The RAN removed from the parent design the 4 canister launched Exocet SSMs (which could have been easily swapped for NSMs); the highly effective Bofors 57mm main gun; the two 20mm secondary armament guns; the helicopter ILS; and a few other less important features. Now they are claiming that the ships lack military effectiveness – and are outrageously trying to blame the builder, Luerssen. It’s a national disgrace and someone in the RAN should be held to account – but of course they won’t be because no one ever is.
Removing the AShM’s and large main gun were sensible decisions given the intended role of the Arafura’s. The removal of helicopter ILS and 20mm machine guns is considerably less so. Now the strategic outlook has changed they can and should be up-gunned with 4 x NSM, Bushmasters Typhoon’s and AA capable 30-40mm main gun. Buckley’s chance of this happening though.
Chief of Navy recently told Senate Estimates that the Arafuras could not be upgraded with additional weapons – which seems flat out wrong.
Could not be or “could not be bothered” to. I think we both know the answer to that.
The navy has just decommissioned another ship, the HMAS Leeuwin (hydrographic) with no replacement. The rate they’re going, we should be down to a third rate navy by the end of the decade. What has happened to the “new” OPV’s? A reduction from 9 to 6 of the new Hunter class, supply ships with major faults, keeping the Collins class subs pass their use by date as it appears all the chips on the table have been put on 6-8 nuclear subs the we won’t see for a decade. How is it that the RAAF was able to procure the F-18 Superhornet as a (very good) interim to the F35 yet the navy cannot be supplied with an interim diesel-electric sub until we acquire the nuclear subs. I know I sound like a broken record, but if people are not made aware of the abysmal decision making processes of the Defence Department, any chance of turning around this stinking corpse of a bureaucracy will be futile.
That’s an accurate summary. Part of the problem is a strange conspiracy of silence between the government and the Coalition on defence topics. Also much of the media has no interest, preferring to focus on economic and social policy stuff.