1 IMDEX 2025 Digital Banner 01 728x90pxThe two bidders – Mitsubishi Heavy Industries (MHI) from Japan and Thyssen Krupp Marine Systems (TKMS) from Germany – are believed to be finalising their offers, with responses due on March 31. More formally known as risk reduction studies for SEA 3000, these are in seven discrete packages, including areas such as Australian build strategy; financials; and propulsion systems.

All Australian taxpayers should be terrified by the obscene level of government secrecy blanketing this project.  The bidders – particularly TKMS – are also understood to be unhappy because they have been blocked from any public discussion about what they are offering.  The position of MHI is slightly easier because it can discuss the Mogami frigates it is delivering to the Japanese Maritime Self Defence Force without breaching the SEA 3000 guidelines – which involve threats of jail for anyone daring to speak about the project.

The baseline offer from TKMS – as we have discussed in previous articles – is the MEKO 200 design being produced for the Egyptian Navy.  Unlike the Japanese government, that of Egypt has no particular interest in helping the Australian media with their inquiries.  TKMS have had to sit back and watch Japan run a highly successful effort based on a desire to increase security cooperation with Australia.

The German government is certainly supportive of TKMS and also has a positive relationship with Canberra but lacks the sheer horsepower of the effort coming from Tokyo.  This is creating the public impression – to the extent that there is one – of a very lopsided competition.  The government is indifferent to what is taking place and shows not the slightest interest in levelling the playing field by giving TKMS the right to speak.

People are entitled to conclude that a decision in favour of Japan has already been taken. This impression is worsened by the fact that Defence is allowing Mitsubishi to offer an upgraded version of the Mogami – strictly speaking, it is the only one available for sale – but are rumoured to have blocked TKMS from offering an upgraded MEKO known as the A210.

Until SEA 3000 came along, all other major naval acquisitions were carried out in public view.  As far back as the mid 2000s, both the Air Warfare Destroyer projects and the Canberra class LHDs were in the open, with competing bids from the US, Spain and France.  The disaster of SEA 1000 submarines was an open process with highly visible activities involving France, Germany and Japan.  Even the equally disastrous SEA 1180 offshore patrol vessel project was a public process with two designs from Germany and one from the Netherlands being very actively marketed.

In all cases, bidders were free to promote their products and explain the benefits of their offers, usually with an emphasis on work to be performed in Australia.  It has been suggested that suppressing all information about SEA 3000 is “normal” and due to “commercial confidentiality” reasons.  These are both lies.  There is nothing normal about what is going on and commercial matters are normally confined to sensitive matters such as competitive pricing.

For SEA 3000, both bidders are probably very concerned about being compelled by the government to use WA shipbuilder Austal for the local build part of the process, due to start in the late 2020s.  No one can understand how it is that Austal have been gifted not one but two precursor contracts – and look set to be handed up to eight General Purpose Frigates with no scrutiny.  The earlier contracts are for medium and heavy landing landing craft.  In addition, Austal has been selected as Defence’s “strategic partner” for work in WA, with little known about the selection parameters.

To be sure, publicly traded Austal is an excellent company with a proven track record – their US subsidiary is doing especially well at the moment – but they are not the only competent heavy engineering company in WA, let alone in the entire country.  At the time of writing, it has not yet signed any of the contracts mentioned – and hence the “strategic partner” agreement is not yet in effect – and in industry there is widespread bemusement about the Svengali-like effect of the company on the current government.

The contracts in question are worth close to a total of $20 billion – great work, if you can get it.

If they are chosen to be the nominated local entity for SEA 3000, the Henderson yard will need significant investment of up to $1 billion for new facilities.  The medium-term ownership of Austal is also the subject of much speculation – the Korean firm Hanwha Ocean has already made one acquisition attempt (subsequently withdrawn) and it is believed that a number of institutional investors, including from the US, are also interested.

These types of government-directed contracts are usually disasters, and both MHI and TKMS are likely to be wary of being forced into some sort of artificial deal that probably relates to a plan to hold onto a few Federal and/or State seats.  Not the least of future difficulties is that both MHI and TKMS will have an easy contractual “out” in the event of major problems because they did not choose Austal but the selection will have been forced on them.

Another reason for the North Korea style of public relations is that the government also does not want Australians to wake up to the fact that because of massive official bungling, for the first time since 1976 we will need to import at least the first three frigates from Germany – or far more likely, Japan.  This is because it has been apparent since 2020 that there was a looming capability gap caused by slow progress on the Hunter class frigate program and the faster than expected retirement of the Anzac class, which have been worked to a premature death.

This capability gap has been ignored by the Coalition, the ALP, Defence and the RAN until there is now little choice but to do something about it in a mad, desperate, secret rush.  Hardly the sort of thing that would inspire public confidence in the lead up to what is expected to be a tight Federal election due to be held before May 27.

The root cause is that neither Labor nor the Coalition seem to understand what continuous naval shipbuilding looks like, let alone award contracts to make it happen.  With a further reduction in numbers of the Hunters from the original nine to the current six and probably three, there will also no longer be the slightest possibility of continuity of work in South Australia either.  Mysteriously, this project is now also shrouded in official secrecy.

Looking at this utterly dismal picture, one wonders why bother building any of the General Purpose Frigates in Australia at all.  It’s hardly as if there’s a thriving naval shipbuilding sector in WA, especially with the cancellation of the SEA 1180 Arafura offshore patrol vessels – originally for around 20 capable ships but now a mere six platforms, deliberately down-designed by the RAN to make them as ineffective as possible.  The former prime contractor Luerssen – one of the world’s most experienced shipbuilders – has been run out of the country.

It is the same institutions – the Coalition, the current Labor government, Defence and the RAN – that are in the process of transferring $4.6 billion to US submarine building companies under AUKUS Pillar One. A transfer of a similar amount to the UK is also underway.  Neither of these huge gifts has a refund clause – something that is likely to make President Donald Trump laugh out aloud the moment he learns of it.

No wonder the government doesn’t want the public hearing the truth about SEA 3000 and the future of naval shipbuilding.

(Disclaimer: neither MHI or TKMS supplied any information about SEA 3000 for this article).

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Kym Bergmann
Kym Bergmann is the editor for Asia Pacific Defence Reporter (APDR) and Defence Review Asia (DRA). He has more than 25 years of experience in journalism and the defence industry. After graduating with honours from the Australian National University, he joined Capital 7 television, holding several positions including foreign news editor and chief political correspondent. During that time he also wrote for Business Review Weekly, undertaking analysis of various defence matters.After two years on the staff of a federal minister, he moved to the defence industry and held senior positions in several companies, including Blohm+Voss, Thales, Celsius and Saab. In 1997 he was one of two Australians selected for the Thomson CSF 'Preparation for Senior Management' MBA course. He has also worked as a consultant for a number of companies including Raytheon, Tenix and others. He has served on the boards of Thomson Sintra Pacific and Saab Pacific.

43 COMMENTS

  1. Better off ditching both and going with Babcock Arrowhead 140 frigate. Costs the same as these ships, well proven. 60-100 crew, 9,000nm range. Also would pack greater fire power with a 48 cell VLS (92 missiles), up to 4×4 cell NSM launches (16 NSMs, 2 x 2 cell advanced deck launchers thats 4-16 missiles, 2 x 30mm typhoons, 4x .50 cal mini typhoons, mk45 5 inch main gun with advanced ammo and a phalanx. Honestly don’t understand how and why you’d waste money on a much less capable ship.

      • Hm, I can’t see your argument is valid.

        Arrowhead 140 – Low performance radar(250km with S-band), engine with low propulsion and power generation (less than 30 knot / less than 8MW), only can fit tactical length VLS, only have short range torpedo tubes, uncertain interoperability with Aegis system, very slow construction speed, none future-proof against super/hypersonic missiles.

        Mogami-class(upgraded) – 4 fixed radars with AAW capability(~400km with X-band), engine with high power generation and output (max 30+ knot / more than 40MW), can fit strike length VLS, can operate Tomahawk missile, can operate long range SAM, can operate super long range SSM (more than 1000km of range), can operate long range vertical launch torpedo, proven and better interoperability with Aegis system, very fast construction roadmap (12 ships in 5 years for the country of the manufacturer), capability enhancements against future threat are guaranteed by baseline upgrade.

        So, which one is much less capable ship now?

    • The Type 31 General Purpose Frigate program (based on Babcock’s Arrowhead 140) is the Royal Navy’s equivalent to the RAN’s SEA 3000 program. The Royal Navy is facing an even more precarious “frigate gap” compared to RAN and they desperately need new hulls in the water as soon and as cheaply as possible because the Type 26 Anti-Submarine Warfare Frigate was proving to be too expensive and too slow to manufacture (surprise surprise). As one of the requirements of SEA 3000 was to have new vessels ready for operations by 2029, Babcock’s Rosyth facilities (currently constructing the Type 31) simply doesn’t have the capacity, nor does the Royal Navy have desire to bridge our capability gap when their own situation is far more desperate. Add on the fact the the Type 31 unfortunately appears to have become delayed it cannot meets the requirements of the SEA 3000 program.

      As to your other points about the Arrowhead being cheaper keep in mind the Type 31 (which is what people base the Arrowheads pricing on) is an extremely light naval offering. It lacks both a bow and towed array sonar (Sonar dipping helicopters are it’s only ASW capability), features a significantly less capable rotating radar and in royal navy service will have crew of 110 people. When you start adding the additional weapons systems you mentioned for the Arrowheads “Full fat” configuration, you not only significantly increase the size of the crew as all of these new systems require new consoles and maintenance personnel, but the cost per ship and also the entire programs lifetime costs dramatically increase.

      A heavily configured Arrowhead 140 would have been a great contender for SEA 5000 but was not ready for prime time during the competitive evaluation tender process IIRC (Neither was the BAE’s Global Comabt Ship for that matter).

      • Thanks for that additional information. However, when you look at the SEA 3000 shortlist, Navantia’s ALFA 3000 was there. What a complete joke – the ALFA is barely 2200 tonnes and 100m in length. It should never have been there – and the only possible explanation is that a dimwit somewhere assumed that the ‘3000’ referred to the tonnage, and no one in Defence bothered checking the basic facts. Surely even the Arrowhead with all of its limitations would have been a better candidate than that.

        • That’s the thing about the governments response to the ELSCFR that has always puzzled me. When I read the publicly accessible version I took the short list of the five vessels to mean “Here are a broad range of ships that could meet the requirements we have set out.” With ALFA 3000 representative of the low end of acceptable capability and the Mogami FFM on the high end. The government in turn seems to have interpreted that as “Here are 5 ships that will meet the requirements. Pick one of them and consider nothing else.”

  2. Kym, I understand the points you make regarding secrecy and sole source procurements etc but as John Howard once famously said “[the government] has been mugged by reality”. The market for shipbuilding is imperfect and the economic theory of the second best must apply, i.e. the government must use all levers at its disposal to support the only two domestic shipyards that can construct steel hull ships of this size including (effective) co-investment. Another option would be to nationalise Austal frankly. As for secrecy, Defence needs to overhaul its glacial procurement process and reduce the cycle time by 33%. If confidentiality contributes to faster cycle times then so be it. The nation has wasted too much time in thinking what needs to be done to redress deficiencies in our naval power and not one extra cent (in real terms) has been added to the defence four year forward estimates. Let’s stop making grandiose statements about what will happen in 10 years time and “just do it”. The decision regarding the off the shelf platforms has already been made. The government should start increasing the defence budget by 10% per year compounding at the expense of the disastrous financial black hole that doubles as the NDIS. When will governments Strat taking defence seriously? If there is a conflict in 2027 all of this discussion will be academic.

    • I don’t believe that obsessive secrecy ever contributes to good outcomes. Defence is not only hiding everything from the Australian public; they are now even dodging providing basic information to another government agency, the ANAO. This nonsense is a direct contribution to Defence being congenitally unable to learn from previous mistakes.

    • “i.e. the government must use all levers at its disposal to support the only two domestic shipyards that can construct steel hull ships of this size including (effective) co-investment.”

      Austal’s operations at the AMC in Henderson do not currently build steel hulls or even ships of “this size”. Civmec (also located at the AMC in Henderson) on the other hand has made their own private investment into a massive shipbuilding hall that can fully accommodate two Hobart class Air Warfare Destroyers in addition to two to four smaller OPV sized vessels. This facility should easily allow simultaneous construction of up to four vessels of 3000-5000 tonne range (two of them will need to have the mast blocks installed in the central hall). They are also currently constructing the all-steel Arafura class patrol vessels in this very hall.

      What makes Austal more more deserving than Civmec for Australia’s continuous naval shipbuilding requirements?

  3. It seems clear that SEA 3000 is being progressed in a manner to minimise negative election impact, rather than addressing the concerns raised in both naval surface combatant review and defence industry in a proactive manner. Having said that the entire subject of maritime surface warfare needs to be assessed based on current experience of Black Sea and Red Sea, and of the need for alternative energy sources for Propulsion.

  4. Great summary on the SEA 3000 program Kym. With the offers being finalised before the upcoming election, do you think the Albanese government will make a decision on this or wait until after the results of the election?

    I would have been OK (not happy, but OK), given our strategic circumstances for the program to have a high level of secrecy to speed up acquisition if government had a reliable track record of choosing good designs AND managing partners, contracts and delivery. Given that both our current in-construction SEA 1180 and SEA 5000 programs have both been curtailed as a result of the Enhanced Lethality Surface Combatant Fleet Review proves that is not the case.

    I 100% agree TKMS should be given “a fair go” to a “right of reply” or we risk the program sliding even further into disrepute. However I will say that a lack of publicly accessible information about the MEKO A200 “concept” from TKMS is not helping them. In comparison Babcock’s Arrowhead 140 marketing website https://www.arrowhead140.com/modular-system-specific-roles/ is something TKMS could be doing to even the scales, but you may be correct in them having already decided the program is one sided.

    I also share your concerns regarding Austal being “knighted” as the Australian governments shipbuilder of choice. While capable, Austal isn’t the only shipbuilder in town and other companies, such as Civmec, (Which has made their own private investment into a new massive shipbuilding hall and currently building out what remains of SEA 1180), Echo Marine Group (Birdon’s original partner for LMV-M) and even BAE Systems – Henderson (currently finishing up the Anzac MCAP) will all be available for business. Their is potential for SEA 3000 to become a collaborative enterprise like the AWD program before it (if lessons learned about the AWD programs failings are taken to heart). If the government truly wants to see an uplift in the Australian Maritime Complex’s shipbuilding capabilities, everyone should get a fair shake of the sauce bottle. At the very least Austal’s shipbuilding contracts should preclude any non-Australian company from owning greater than a 51% stake in the company.

    I find it difficult to believe we would see a further reduction in the numbers of the Hunter class frigate. The Albanese government is sticking rather dogmatically to the recommendations of the ELSCFR and a future Coalition government would not further curtail the program given they green-lighted it (though they are probably relieved others have done that for them). But I agree with your general point that contacts, not reviews, not proposals or strategies are what’s necessary to drive continuous naval shipbuilding. I keep thinking of Robert Nioa’s response to your questions related to the gifting of $4.7 billion to both the U.S.A and U.K shipbuilding programs. That amount of money would be “transformational” to Australian defence industry.

    • Thanks – and you have raised a few important points. I don’t think there’s time to make an announcement before the Federal election because the government will have to go into caretaker mode by mid-April at the latest. It’s theoretically possible that the bids could be opened on March 31st and a winner declared – but just reading through proposals and preparing a Cabinet submission takes time. Also because of the way the government has mishandled the entire thing, I don’t think Australian voters are in any way prepared for a sudden shock announcement. To the minimal extent that people pay attention to Defence, I think coming out with the news of a multi-billion dollar project to buy ships from overseas when they could be built here would be a profound negative.

      There is no correlation between secrecy and speed. The government could have stuck with this incredibly rushed timeframe – itself a major mistake – and at the same time permitted companies to describe their offers. Doing so would not have slowed things by a single day. The only reason for the cover-up is to conceal the multiple idiocies around this entire venture.

      Yes, there are alternatives to Austal – and Civmec and Birdon are also high on my list.

      Regarding the Hunters, I’m not saying a further cut in numbers is likely – but equally, it can’t be ruled out. Once again, because of the government’s information blackout, we only have official statements – becoming less and less frequent – that everything is going wonderfully well. My own instincts are to the contrary. If a future government is informed of further cost overruns and delays, a Defence Minister with more spine than Richard Marles might have to take drastic action.

    • Since the program was announced, it was Q4 2024 down select and Q4 2025 final selection.
      Q1 or Q2 steel cutting 2026 at an overseas yard.
      As Kym said, ship 3 of the upgraded Mogami type will likely be Australia’s first and built at Japan Marine United Shipyard, which would be delivered in 2029.

  5. Thanks Kym. Its unfortunate that Sea 3000 is being run as it is. The tender method and secrecy is not defensible. As a former public servant familiar with tendering process for major infrastructure projects I find it galling than Defence and the RAN in particular seem to not meet the PM standards other PS departments require.

    As to the specifics, I wish we would get both Mekos and Mogamis! How? We should drop the Hunter project entirely (too late, too costly, too little firepower on too big a hull) and build the Mogami as the Tier One ship and the Meko as the Tier Two ship.

    The Meko has great range, serviceability and seaworthiness. It is an ideal Tier Two patrol frigate. The Mogami has a far better radar and RCS and similar armament to a Hunter, despite being 2/3 the tonnage and half the cost. It is capable of being fielded as a Tier One warship. For the $27 billion allocated to 3 Hunters we could get a far more useful fleet of 6+ Mogamis. More platforms, faster and cheaper.

  6. In regard to Austal, the Prime Minister has visited WA on many occasions and believes if he wishes a second term he needs to win this state. Politicians in my opinion look to what is best for them rather than what is best for the country. Perhaps this is why companies such as Austal are receiving large numbers of builds.,

  7. I suspect that the Government has already made it’s decision and is simply going through the motions of appearing to conduct a credible selection process.

    I guess we will know the selection outcome soon enough – even if no other details will be made available.

    • Look at the timeline, I don’t see how the government can announce anything before going into election caretaker mode. That could be as soon as early March, which is before the bids have even been received. I wonder what a future Defence Minister will make of this total mess.

  8. I’m disappointed in your article 😕 I didn’t even bother reading all of it …. to politically motivated instead of just telling facts

  9. The German offer is strictly transactional, it’s about selling a frigate to Australia, plain and simple.

    In contrast, the Japanese offer is much more than just a sale; it’s a handshake, an invitation to collaborate as strategic partners in defending against common threats in the region. This partnership reflects a deeper alignment of national interests, shared values, and a willingness to invest in each other’s security. It’s not just about the technology or the ship; it’s about the trust and cooperation that come with the deal.

    That distinction is what makes the Japanese offer so compelling for Australia’s long-term defence strategy.

    • I fear for the relationship when Japan comes up against RAN / DoD program managers, who will probably be the same people who destroyed the OPV project and drove Luerssen out of the country.

  10. Kym, what’s your alliance with Luerssen? It’s clear the the Luerssen OPV was the wrong design for the future. The right decision to build Mogami frigates is and will be the right choice going forward! The Hunter class will be built and the same hull used to build a new destroyer.. common hull and facilities already set up to build them. The only issue with the RAN seems to be the the evolved Cape Class.. they are barely good enough to be constabulary vessels and should all be offloaded to ABF! A replacement of these should be the area the RAN puts thought into is to how to control the grey zone

      • The government should immediately create a paramilitary coast guard and transfer all OPVs, patrol boats, ABF cutters and personnel to that agency, run by Home affairs. This would, to some extent, alleviate manpower shortages in the navy and allow the navy to focus on warfighting rather than constabulary duties.

        • I’m more than a little puzzled by this Coast Guard idea which gets aired regularly.
          If we cannot get enough people to enlist in the RAN to crew boats how are we going to find people to enlist in the ABF to crew the same boats?
          The ABF has already had to cut back on sea hours because, amongst other matters, they don’t have the crews to man their current vessels.
          Add another layer of bureaucracy and several more layers of people with shiny pants and lots of brass on their shoulders to that and all I can see is a lot of money wasted

  11. I genuinely fear that Defence will go for the Mogami. Great looking hull but an absolute nightmare from the onboard systems perspective. Particularly the combat system, but also the towed array / VDS, and radar. I really hope Defence are considering the implications of adopting the Japanese OYQ-1 and integrated CIC concept.

    • Sebastian, could you expand on your “absolute nightmare” comment. Most comments I have seen so far have been extremely positive about this ship. Also it seems it could be delivered sooner than expected. Andrew Greene has written an article stating that Japan’s defence chief says Australia could receive the first of his country’s new and upgraded Mogami warships ahead of his own navy. Under current plans, the JMSDF expects to receive the first of the 12 new upgraded Mogami warships in 2027.

      • The ship has a lot of bespoke Japanese gear. The OYQ-1 combat management system (CMS) and OYX-1-29 display system are built to support the unique integrated CIC concept. Multiple systems are hosted on the same underlying virtualisation architecture, including machinery control, charting, damage control etc. Overall that is customised to accomodate the circular central design of the CIC. The resource sharing and automation is what helps to achieve their stated low crewing requirements. However this level of specialisation will inherently lead to some coupling and inflexibility and thus inability to achieve commonality between platforms in the future. It would be a nightmare if we ever wanted to change out the CMS for something else (9LV, TACTICOS, straight up AEGIS, whatever). From the layout of the CIC to the need to consider all the other cohosted systems. Just a logistical nightmare.

        The innovative CIC is also a significant leap away from what the rest of the western navies have. Putting combat functions sat next to day-to-day support functions in the CIC is a big doctrinal change. Human factors will be very different, as will training.

        Add the bespoke nature of the other homegrown sensors; UNICORN mast, variable depth sonar, towed array, and IO/IR. No commonality with anything we operate currently, nor the US, nor NATO.

        Tacking on our EW systems will be a big challenge also. Not sure how far along SEA5011 is, but I’m pretty certain this will be very complicated indeed.

        At least with the MEKO is very modular and customisable by design. A very good out of the box combat system like TACTICOS or even 9LV will be easy to implement. If they did go with a TACTICOS then they also have a huge number of NATO and US sensor and effectors that are already integrated on an interface level. Plus the local workforce with Thales in Aus has the ability to support it well. TACTICOS was put on the Egyptian ship without any fuss just fine. It’s on hundreds of other ships including the UK type 31. So we know it is very adaptable. That would give SaaB breathing room in the interim to concentrate on hunter, Hobart, and existing anzacs.

        Meanwhile, we could easily get our Australian towed array and the CAPTAS without it being a massive new development effort to make it work with the Japanese CMS (alternatively having to just use there’s as is).

        This is just some of the issues I see.

      • Too many bespoke home grown systems. Including the CMS, radar, towed array and variable depth sonar. CIC is a very innovative design but does not gel with current western practices. Having CIC host machine control, chart navigation, damage and fire control ontop of combat management has significant implications to human factors and security compartmentalisation. It will be difficult to achieve efficiency through commonality as the Japanese CMS and sensors are so integral to the overall ship design. If we did ever want a 9LV, CEAFAR, nulka or Australian towed array, then it will be a huge undertaking. At least with what the Germans have on offer, there is considerable pedigree with NATO and US systems already. Order of magnitude less risk and huge amount more flexibility over time.

        • Sebastian, thank you for your detailed and informative reply. You make some excellent and convincing points. With the production requirements placed on competitors by the Australian government, I guess it necessarily involves compromises, trade-offs and other considerations. In light of this, the Mogami’s larger size, stealthy, modern design, low crew size and 32 VLS give it distinct advantages over the A200. The long term cost saving from sharing integration costs for future and updated systems with the JMSDF might also be a benefit. If TKMS were allowed to offer the A210 then it would be a different matter to some extent.

          • It is a very lopsided competition between a relatively low cost proven design in the form of the MEKO 200 versus a potentially huge step into the unknown. As I have written elsewhere, I’m not sure the RAN is any longer capable of rational analysis.

  12. Japan’s defence chief seriously ratcheting up the competition stating Australia could receive the first of his country’s new and upgraded Mogami warships ahead of his own navy.
    According to MHI media JMSDF is expecting 2 upgraded Mogamis by 2028.
    On another note, surprising that Mogami’s dedicated mother ship design efficiently deploying a trifecta of unmanned air, surface & underwater platforms seldom rates a mention in such threads.

    https://www.abc.net.au/news/2025-01-29/japan-vows-to-give-australia-first-access-to-mogami-warship/104868658

    https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=qVmCT2qsFQs

  13. I can’t remember who said the Arrowhead 140 wouldn’t have enough power.. it isn’t hard to put larger generators in the ship. Be it classis diesel or turbines like the US have. At the very least the Japanese ship should have a 48 cell VLS and 16 NSMs.

  14. Every comment so far has merit worth considering but the one thing everyone is forgetting is that the final decision will be made ( if it hasn’t already been made) for whatever Political gain the Government will get ( the other mob would be doing the same) regardless of any capability the RAN needs. The Mogami Frigate is an excellent design, as far as I know none have actually been built ( I refer to the one we will be getting, not the one Tendered) , I also believe the Meko A200 is an excellent ship, again not the ship tendered . For some reason WA is the only place that will be making ADF ships, while every other facility is left to flounder, be sold off as Real Estate or just ignored. I’m still convinced that having all your ship building in one place is a good idea. Except if your an Admiral or Air Marshall of a Foreign Belligerent.

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